9 August 1944 Part 1

9 August 1944 US Navy squadron attacks off Jersey and loss of PT 509

Editorial note: Contemporary report of the action, written on 12 September. Enemy damage is reported or claimed; no sinking is established by this report. Later accounts below concern the same incidents.

9 August 0450 First contact

Maloy radioed a target seven miles distant at 296°, four miles from Point La Corbière, on course 180° at 12 knots. Tunny, led by Lieutenant F. W. Daniel, was vectored on course 120° and obtained radar contact at five miles before proceeding independently. Visibility was only 25 yards. Maloy’s plot showed an irregular attacking course. At 2500 yards Daniel ordered deployment ahead to starboard into right echelon. [D page 2]

0535 to 0600 First torpedo attack

At 0535 and 2000 yards, the boats fired starboard torpedoes. PT 500 fired both torpedoes through a misunderstanding of orders. The attacking course was 120° and the enemy course 150°. No results were observed. Maloy had steamed south roughly parallel to the enemy and could not plot this attack, which was beyond her six to seven mile radar range for PT boats. Tunny retired to port and rejoined Maloy at 0600. [D page 2]

9 August 1944 continued

0608 Barracuda attacks

The enemy rounded La Corbière and headed east about two miles offshore. Maloy vectored Barracuda towards them. At 0608, three miles on bearing 180° from La Corbière, Lieutenant A. M. Crist led PT 509 and PT 508 in column across the enemy’s bow and closed from inshore. Fog restricted visibility to 150 yards. PT 509 released one torpedo about a quarter mile off the enemy’s port bow. PT 508 had not sighted the enemy and initially did not fire; her radar was inoperative because of a broken generator connecting rod. Both boats turned to port at idling speed on three engines and returned in the same position, after which PT 508 was ordered into right echelon. [D page 2]

PT 509 disappears Exact time unrecorded

Maloy’s plot showed the enemy in two lines, with the two rear minesweepers slightly behind. PT 508 fired her starboard torpedo on Crist’s radio order from PT 509, although PT 508 had not sighted the enemy. Crist reported the enemy dead ahead and said he was in their midst. Heavy firing then broke out between PT 509 and a minesweeper on her port bow. PT 508 could not fire over PT 509; her captain, Lieutenant C. R. Whorton, held fire and turned to starboard at idling speed. Enemy fire lasted about twenty seconds. [D page 3]

PT 508 restored radar for five minutes and followed the enemy, but radar sweeps and radio calls failed to locate PT 509. She followed to within 1½ miles of St Helier harbour before turning away because of the risk from shore batteries. Maloy had been too far away to plot the attack, but subsequently plotted PT 509 disappearing into the enemy radar return and obtained no further trace. PT 508 rejoined Maloy at 0710. [D page 3]

0724 Command transfers to PT 503

Sherertz went aboard PT 503. PT 500, having no torpedoes, remained with Maloy. PT 503 and PT 507 patrolled about 1½ miles offshore without finding PT 509. They obtained a radar target in St Helier roadstead, later identified as two “M” class minesweepers lying to, and approached in column on course 005°. [D page 3]

9 August final attack and withdrawal

0800 Close range engagement

At 200 yards the target disappeared from radar through nearness. The fog lifted, revealing a minesweeper dead ahead and bow on, with another obscured to starboard. PT 503 immediately fired her port torpedo and all forward guns. PT 507, still in column, did not fire a torpedo. Both exchanged gunfire and turned away laying smoke. PT 503 reported seven 37 mm hits on the enemy bridge before return fire began; PT 507 also reported effective strafing and 37 mm hits. Enemy return fire was heavy and accurate. [D page 3]

PT 507 received one 37 mm hit and lighter hits in the day room. PT 503 received a 37 mm or 40 mm shell in the engine room and 20 mm and lighter hits elsewhere. Maloy observed heavier calibre shells landing beyond the boats as they withdrew through each other’s smoke. Fouled engines, attributed to the all night patrol at idling speed, limited evasive action to 1400 rpm. [D page 3]

0837 to 0840 Casualties transferred and return begins

PT 503 and PT 507 met Maloy at 0837, seven miles south of La Corbière. All casualties were transferred aboard the destroyer escort, and at 0840 the force got underway for Cherbourg. [D page 3]

Reported losses and damage

The report listed PT 509 missing with all hands, including her crew and officers. PT 503 had two dead and four wounded and damage requiring ten days of repair. PT 507 had one wounded and light fire and shrapnel damage around the day room. It assessed one enemy minesweeper damaged and probable damage to another. These are contemporary assessments, with no confirmed sinking recorded. [D page 1]

Ammunition recorded: PT 509 probably two torpedoes and gunfire; PT 500 two torpedoes; PT 508 one torpedo; PT 503 two torpedoes, 400 rounds of .50 calibre, 14 rounds of 37 mm and 20 rounds of 40 mm; PT 507 one torpedo, 156 rounds of .50 calibre, 27 rounds of 37 mm and 45 rounds of 40 mm. [D pages 1–2]

Report assessments

Sherertz considered the observed PT gunfire extremely accurate and probably responsible for moderate enemy casualties and damage. He attributed enemy alertness during the third attack to the earlier attacks. He found no particular grounds to believe the enemy was using radar, suggesting instead that exhaust noise or hydrophone detection of propellers might have alerted them. PT 508 and PT 503 had each been operating with two mufflers off. These explanations remain the report’s assessments. No map or sketch accompanies the four supplied pages. [D page 4]

US Navy. Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 34, action report dated 12 September 1944, source set D, pages 1–4. Supplied compilation: Jersey Convoy Action 13 to 14 August 1944.docx. Set letters and page or screenshot numbers refer to that compilation.