7 January 1943 Part 5

7 January 1943 Preliminary report on the loss of Schokland

Secret. Copy. Annex 4 to war diary. Operations Staff, 7 January 1943. Priority SSD teleprinter to Naval Staff.

Naval Commandant Channel Islands reports: preliminary account of steamer Schokland’s loss during night 4/5 January 1943. Very dark night, cloudy with rain showers, so lights were at times hard to see or invisible. NW force 4–5; sea state 3–4. Low water (spring tide) at 0026. Grounding at 0100. Patrol boats were south of Corbière. Schokland and Holland, at anchor in the roads since 1300, were to sail to meet them. At 2350 the Jersey harbour captain ordered this at the patrol boats’ request.

Schokland passed the buoy south of Noirmont Point to port and steered 262° true. The upper leading light was invisible in rain squalls, as was Corbière light. At about 0100 the ship touched bottom at approximately 6 knots. She sank in 30 minutes. One lifeboat with 16 people got away; the other could not be cleared. Everyone else jumped overboard in lifejackets and clung to rafts. Harbour-protection craft and tugs could not find the sinking position in the darkness because the patrol boat’s position report was too imprecise.

Army: 78 rescued, 8 dead, 46 missing. Luftwaffe: 31 rescued, 1 dead, 35 missing. Navy: 8 rescued, 1 dead, 2 missing. Organisation Todt: 41 rescued, 5 dead, 30 missing. Dutch crew: 14 rescued, 1 missing. Captain not yet fit to be questioned.

Group West adds: without anticipating the responsibility findings of the court-martial investigation already begun, in our view the loss most probably resulted from faulty navigation in poor visibility. Rescue measures [continued].

Rescue measures were made extremely difficult by the currents in dangerous waters. Independently of the court-martial investigation, enquiries into the following questions have begun:

1. Had the steamer been specially fitted out for carrying men on leave? What was the maximum permitted complement? What instructions did the captain have? What other safety regulations and measures had been established?

2. In what state of readiness were the harbour-protection boats at Saint Helier? What other rescue boats were available? Who directed rescue measures from shore? When did the signal station notice the distress signal, and how and when was it passed to the harbour captain? Group West G0709 A1 (Operations Staff).

T-1022 Roll 4008; PG 37545 | frame 0148; PG 37545 | frame 0149. Extract from T1022_R4008_English_Translation.docx.