5 September 1942 Part 5

5 September 1942 Army inquiry into command responsibility and defence of Les Casquets

Date note: The reports and questions belong to 5 September. References to January, March and April concern earlier command arrangements. The raid itself is already recorded; these are additional inquiry papers.

Army headquarters, 5 September 1942

LXXXIV Army Corps headquarters reports at 09:00 (First Lieutenant Paulsen, by inverter telephone).

In reply to Commander-in-Chief West, Operations Section, No. 2641/42, secret command matter, the 319th Infantry Division reported to Commander-in-Chief West:

The division knew that the Les Casquets lighthouse, 10 km west of Alderney, was occupied. The strength of its garrison was unknown. It consisted solely of naval personnel, subordinate to the Naval Commander Normandy, not the Naval Commander Channel Islands. At 18:00 on 4 September the Naval Commander Channel Islands reported that, during his inspection of Alderney, he had found Les Casquets deserted, the wireless set smashed and the remainder ransacked.

Enquiries by the Island Commandant Alderney with naval offices established that the naval garrison, recorded as 1/6, had last been supplied with provisions on 31 August. The last wireless contact was at 00:00 on 3 September; the wireless set had frequently been out of order. At 21:45 on 4 September the navy reoccupied the lighthouse with a strength recorded as 1/10 and reported it ready. On 5 September 1942 an army officer will be sent to Les Casquets to clarify the matter further and simultaneously examine defensive measures.

LXXXIV Army Corps headquarters, Operations Section, No. 1877/42, secret command matter.

Recorded by Feldwebel Pfeiffer.

[The strength notation 1/6 and 1/10 is retained as printed, without expanding the categories. Handwritten routing initials are not fully legible.]

Secret command matter. Teletype to Seventh Army Headquarters. Dispatched 5 September 1942 at 15:35; received at 16:00.

The following must be reported immediately, at the latest by 17:30:

1. Had the divisional commander been officially informed that a naval post existed on Casquets, and by whom?

2. How had he or his staff learned of it at all?

3. What did he know about the naval post’s strength, its successive reliefs and its supervision?

4. Had he himself visited this post?

5. What preparations had the divisional commander made in the event of an attack on Casquets?

6. Why had the divisional commander, in the reports required under Commander-in-Chief West Army Group D, Ia No. 670/42, secret command matter, of 5 April 1942, reported nothing about this post, so that Commander-in-Chief West had not been informed of its existence?

7. The Commanding General’s and the Commander-in-Chief’s assessment of the divisional commander.

Commander-in-Chief West, signed von Rundstedt, Field Marshal. Army Group D headquarters, Ia No. 2640/42, secret command matter. Receipt confirmation: 16:00, Steinbach.

Secret command matter. Teletype to Seventh Army Headquarters. Dispatched 5 September 1942 at 16:50; received at 16:55.

Supplement to Commander-in-Chief West, Army Group D headquarters, Ia No. 2640/42, secret command matter, dated 5 September 1942:

Question 8. Why did the Commander of the Channel Islands not place this post under his own command in accordance with Führer Directive 40, since he is responsible for his entire island area, thus including Casquets?

Question 9. Is reoccupation considered tenable?

Question 10. If so, how is the defence of Casquets planned? Protection by barriers, an obstacle all around, fast attack craft held ready to provide support, garrison strength and weapons, and so forth.

Commander-in-Chief West, signed von Rundstedt, Field Marshal. Army Group D headquarters, Ia No. 2644/42, secret command matter.

Army headquarters, 5 September 1942, 19:00

Inverter telephone message

LXXXIV Army Corps headquarters to Seventh Army Headquarters and Commander-in-Chief West

[Secret command matter stamp crossed through. The questions answered below are not reproduced on this page.]

Regarding point 1: when the divisional commander assumed command over Alderney at the end of January 1942, the Island Commandant Alderney officially informed him of the naval post in the lighthouse on Les Casquets.

Regarding point 2: by the Commandant of Alderney.

Regarding point 3: strength of the naval post: one non-commissioned officer and six men with a light machine gun. The divisional commander knew nothing about the relief or supervision of the post.

Regarding point 4: no, because it was subordinate to the navy — the Naval Commander Normandy.

Regarding point 5: the naval post was equipped with rifles, two light machine guns and 120 hand grenades. In the assessment of the Naval Commander Normandy this was sufficient to repel any landing on the island, which, owing to its configuration and the navigable waters, was extremely difficult and possible in a small boat only on certain days of the month. For the same reason the Naval Commander Normandy had not requested army protection.

Regarding point 6: the naval post was not reported under Commander-in-Chief West, Ia 670/42, secret command matter, because its duties were purely navigational. However, it was reported to Fifteenth Army Headquarters and by that headquarters to Commander-in-Chief West, with reference to Commander-in-Chief West, Army Group D, Ia No. 507/42, secret command matter, of 22 March 1942, under Fifteenth Army Headquarters, Ia No. 1529/42, secret command matter, of 22 March 1942, point 7, in the following words:

a. Les Casquets, north of Alderney.

b. Rocky islet with a lighthouse and a naval lighthouse garrison.

c. 80 by 50 metres.

d. Of no tactical significance.

Regarding point 7. Assessment by the Commanding General:

He led an infantry regiment with distinction against the enemy. As commander of the 319th Infantry Division since 15 November 1940, and as commander of the English Channel Islands, he has fully proved himself, trained his division well for its duties and continued the development of the islands’ defences purposefully, thoughtfully and methodically.

Regarding point 8:

Because the post has purely navigational naval duties and is of no significance for the defence of the island area. At the time of its capture the post was subordinate to the Naval Commander Normandy, not the Naval Commander Channel Islands.

Regarding point 9:

According to the Naval Commander Channel Coast, the naval post on Les Casquets is considered necessary for navigational reasons; it has no tactical significance for the defence of the Channel Islands.

Regarding point 10:

The Naval Commander Channel Coast would have to decide to what extent barriers and obstacles all around can be installed and fast attack craft kept ready. Whether an army security detachment must be provided for the naval post, and at what strength, is currently being examined by a battalion commander of the 319th Infantry Division, who has not yet returned from reconnaissance.

LXXXIV Army Corps headquarters, Operations Section, 6853, Secret.

Addition by Seventh Army Headquarters to point 7: the Commander-in-Chief agrees with the assessment.

Seventh Army Headquarters, Operations Section, No. 3933/42, Secret.

German Seventh Army records, T-312 Roll 1548. T312 Roll 1548 English translation REVIEWED EDITION 4.docx. Local source scans: 0134.jpg, 0136.jpg, 0137.jpg, 0138.jpg, 0139.jpg, 0140.jpg.