5 October 1943 Part 4

5 October 1943 General review of corps defensive capability as at 1 October

Top secret. Corps headquarters to Seventh Army, 5 October, forwarding the completed general-review questionnaire; enclosure dated 4 October.

A. Corps sector. Mainland: Calvados, 716th Division, 97 km; Cotentin, 709th Division, 220 km; total 317 km. Channel Islands, 319th Division: Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney and Sark, total 117 km [individual lengths indistinct]. Landings are possible everywhere, though coast and tidal currents make the Saint-Vaast–Cap de la Hague stretch, west coast and Channel Islands particularly difficult from the naval standpoint. Geographically best for major landings: Orne estuary; Lion-sur-Mer–Tracy-sur-Mer; Colleville–Vierville; Cotentin east coast between the Vire estuary and Saint-Vaast; northwest coasts of Alderney and Guernsey; on Jersey, St Ouen’s Bay on the west coast and St Brelade’s and St Aubin’s Bays on the south coast.

Divisional combat value. Personnel: see enclosure. Artillery: 716th Division organically has only one light battalion, a regimental staff and two battalion staffs. Five equipment batteries have therefore been formed; their establishment urgently needs authorization. Overall artillery is not fully effective. 709th Division has a regimental staff not yet functioning and two light battalions with mixed weapons. A third battalion requires approval of equipment batteries’ establishments and the promised but overdue II/669 staff. Its artillery is insufficient. 319th Division’s four light battalions are numerically adequate and uniformly equipped, but batteries are immobile and a heavy battalion is lacking; improvised motorization and strong island coastal artillery compensate in its present role.

Heavy infantry weapons: 716th and 709th are weak by establishment, lacking machine-gun and infantry-gun companies. Static weapons partly remedy this, making the quantity adequate, but the weapons are immobile. 319th is slightly better established, with an infantry-gun platoon per regiment, and numerous additional static heavy weapons make its provision good.

Antitank defence: 716th is entirely inadequately equipped by establishment: no antitank rifles, only a horse-drawn platoon of three 5 cm guns per regiment, and a single antitank company improvised with two 8.8 cm and six 7.5 cm Pak97/38 in place of nine authorized 7.5 cm guns. Additional static antitank rifles, guns and 5 cm tank guns partly help, but almost all are immobile on the coast and only partly supplied with ammunition effective against modern tanks. Of eight new 8.8 cm guns, only the company’s two can be made mobile owing to lack of towing vehicles. Overall active antitank defence is too weak. The same applies to 709th: all eight 8.8 cm guns are static, the antitank company has ten 5 cm guns, and the extensive sector makes its antitank defence much too weak; reserves especially lack mobile weapons effective against modern tanks. 319th has an antitank company per regiment and two more in Mobile Battalions 319 and 450.

With seventy-five static antitank guns and seventy coastal 10.5 cm K331(f) suitable against tanks, defence is good, though ammunition against the most modern tanks is lacking here too.

Training: 716th’s men are adequately trained for all combat and well trained for positional fighting; junior leaders are not uniformly satisfactory because of lack of combat experience. Half the officer corps is over-age and inexperienced, including all infantry battalion commanders. 709th’s men and NCOs are well trained despite the current personnel exchange, but some officers lack experience, particularly company/battery and battalion commanders. I have so far met 319th’s troops only on Alderney. Its commander considers it well trained for island duties; newly arrived older replacements and recruits still need training on the many unfamiliar weapons.

Final divisional assessments: 716th has good troops who deserve better lower and middle leadership. It is fully capable of defending its sector, but organization, training and leadership would not suit mobile warfare. 709th has good, generally well-led troops and can perform its defensive task; mobile employment would require fundamental reorganization and improvements in composition and training. 319th is considered capable of its present task by its commander; further judgment awaits closer acquaintance with leaders and troops.

Permanent fortifications. Calvados has few, but correctly sited works already blocking access to the Orne estuary and adjoining coast, impeding landings at the Vire estuary and entrance to Courseulles harbour. Army coastal batteries are developed, but guns lack concrete cover. Only one other battery can be fitted with permanent casemates. Gun emplacements are planned or under construction for all anti-landing guns and most tank guns and heavy/medium weapons. Overall: 66 percent complete, 26 percent under construction. Cotentin-East’s few permanent works are usable except command posts. Cherbourg completion: Osteck 95 percent, Westeck 85, maritime station 92, Fort du Roule 50, Valognes road 98, land front 30, sea front 80. Works already have defensive value; casemate batteries remain unfinished and some wiring has begun. No artillery battery’s permanent gun installation is complete; three are being built. Personnel/ammunition accommodation is complete at five batteries and being built at four; six permanent control posts exist.

Nearly all permanent works lie in Cherbourg defence area. Army coastal batteries are otherwise concreted except open guns. Cherbourg sea front already has strong infantry resistance but inadequate flank/rear protection.

Channel Islands: 400,000 cubic metres of concrete have been used. Defences on Guernsey’s and Jersey’s threatened fronts are so strengthened that landings there appear very difficult. Much other construction benefits three modern naval batteries, one 30.5 cm and two 15 cm. Tunnel construction is beginning to yield results. Alderney construction has lagged through various difficulties.

Field fortifications. Calvados: greatly improved over the past year; almost all strongpoints/resistance nests have splinter-proof accommodation, heavy weapons have flanking open embrasure positions unless in ring stands, sufficient tank-protection foxholes exist, combat/communication trenches continue and all-round obstacles are present. Cotentin-East: generally good, but few works withstand heavy preparatory fire; further protection will shortly be undertaken. Cherbourg sea front: good, fields of fire being improved. Land front: well designed but of little tactical value until fields of fire are cleared and antitank security achieved. Jobourg: good and resistant. Cotentin-West: good, but wide extent and sandy dunes limit value. Channel Islands: field and reinforced field works supplement permanent coastal works; most artillery splinter-proof shelters are complete and accommodation for reserves is under construction.

Artillery defensive power. Calvados: not wholly adequate. Four batteries each in Orne and Vire subgroups, the former barely sufficient and latter insufficient. Right-neighbour support at the army boundary is adequate; only one left-neighbour battery can support effectively. Only two army coastal batteries, at the flanks, specifically engage naval targets. Numbers and calibres will not permit a decisive role; the centre is especially weak. Cotentin north coast: enough batteries numerically, inadequate calibre and protection. Naval-target batteries cannot effectively fight heavy ships and open guns are vulnerable to naval and air fire. Luftwaffe heavy antiaircraft batteries give effective support. Planned remedy: a 38 cm battery at Gréville with two twin armoured turrets. East-coast artillery is a mere skeleton, incapable of effectively engaging naval forces; west coast has none. Army-group reserve, Special Motorized Artillery Regimental Staff 621 and Heavy Battalions 456 and 457, must reinforce east/west coastal fighting when necessary. Planned III/669 deployment near Les Pieux improves Vauville Bay and the favourable beach west of Surtainville.

Channel Islands are generally plentifully supplied with artillery, strengthened by ninety-six heavy antiaircraft guns. Only Battery Mirus on Guernsey, four 30.5 cm guns, can engage heavy ships with prospects of success. Modern 15 cm naval batteries on Guernsey and Alderney are permanently emplaced and especially suitable against destroyers/light cruisers owing to fire-control equipment and rapid fire. Other heavy artillery has limited value against armoured ships owing to lack of armour-piercing ammunition and slow rate of fire.

Heavy infantry weapons: emphasis on concrete protection [opening clause partly faded]. In parts of central Calvados and especially western Cotentin, resistance nests are too far apart to cover intervening ground effectively. Communications: mainland telephone network generally adequate, but buried cables only in Orne/Vire groups, Cotentin east coast, Cherbourg and parts of Jobourg. Cherbourg uses French underground cables. Elsewhere civilian PTT and field lines are vulnerable. Radio meets essential needs but expansion is prevented by personnel/equipment shortages. Surrender of backpack radio sections b and f has removed links. Firing-position radios often must serve both observation posts and battalions; some batteries use D apparatus whose range is quite insufficient. Island telephone and radio networks meet requirements.

Stocks: infantry ammunition no longer fully meets requirements. Rifle-grenade launchers, grenade rifle39 and 8.8 cm antitank guns lack even the initial allocation. Roughly one allocation is missing for MG34 German ammunition, 5 cm antitank guns and French light infantry guns; up to two allocations for 7.5 cm antitank guns, 4.7 cm Pak181(f), 3.7 cm antiaircraft and 5 cm mortars [some designations faint]. Teller mines replace missing magnetic hollow charges, but only 25 percent have the required detonating fuse; those with T.Mi.Z.35 are only partly suitable for close tank combat. New rules require one allocation for weapons in resistance nests and less-important strongpoints to be stored in divisional depots, besides reserves. Storage is being created; troops retain ammunition meanwhile. Depot care needs personnel beyond the existing supply platoons, which also support administrative units. Divisions receive light-MG ammunition scales even though many light guns on tripods are used as heavy guns, leaving insufficient quantities.

Food stocks and storage are adequate.

Overall defensive judgment: corps will defeat minor landings. A major assault along the entire front may penetrate central 716th Division and east/west Cotentin, accompanied by airborne landings around Caen and Carentan–La Haye-du-Puits–Lessay. Corps probably can successfully fight for Cotentin with available reserves; 716th should hold its more important coastal sectors long enough for operational reserves to counterattack. The islands can repel every enemy landing, but air/naval forces may neutralize their long-range artillery, particularly Alderney’s.

B. Special points: antiaircraft protection around Caen is moderately adequate, Cherbourg/Jobourg adequate and parts of the islands strong. Elsewhere it is almost absent, limited to a few coastal-battery and troop machine guns. This is especially serious in a major attack because effective fighter cover is scarcely to be expected in the first days.

C. Requirements: at least one modern long-range naval battery each northwest of Bayeux and on the Cotentin east and west coasts; modernize obsolete naval batteries at Cherbourg and on the islands. Authorize equipment-battery establishments; provide a second light artillery battalion for central 716th Division and quickly supply II/669 staff. Site 711th Division artillery so it supports farther into 716th’s right sector. Replace over-age, inexperienced officers with younger combat veterans. Provide independent regimental antitank elements with three 7.5 cm guns and their necessary trains [heading faint]. Supply more antitank guns for important inland points/local reserves; accelerate construction with additional labour, possibly Italian prisoners; increase armour-piercing ammunition for all weapons where developed; enlarge mainland divisional supply platoons into companies for proper ammunition-depot work.

D. Troop morale: spirit is consistently good, although the war’s duration, bombing and monotonous military life without combat cause worries. Readiness is unaffected; troops are reliable and fully under their leaders’ control. Signed Marcks.

Personnel enclosure: officer and combatant NCO/men strengths, Eastern Front experience, fitness categories, birth-year groups, German nationality-list category III and average ages are tabulated by formation. The detailed statistical grid is embedded for reference.

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T-314 Roll 1604, T314_R1604_English_Translation.docx. 5 October 1943 | Source PDF pages 1023–1035. Selected island-related text; document or report date governs placement.