5 May 1942 Part 1

5 May 1942 St Malo convoy diary

St Malo. Light wind, calm sea, visibility five nautical miles, coastal haze and fog. 01:00: because of defective arrangements by the harbour captain, only part of the night troop convoy is locked out; V 206 remains in harbour and is put into the lock later. 03:15: V 206 reports it can no longer leave because the water has fallen too far. V 212 has meanwhile proceeded seaward with H 23 and Maas, since anchoring in the narrow waters with falling tide seemed inadvisable. My order for V 212 to anchor with convoy off St Malo could no longer be transmitted visually.

04:00: I request V 212’s position by radio. The message had to be sent twice: a mechanical fault in cipher M caused the first encryption to be wrong. I could not implement my intention to assign V 208, expected off St Malo about 03:00 with V 209 and RO 45, to accompany V 212’s convoy to Jersey: word arrived that V 208/09 and RO 45 had returned to Guernsey owing to fog. 05:25: V 212 radios that it has anchored with H 23 and Maas in the middle of grid square 3841 [grid digits partly obscured]. 06:00: since additional protection is unavailable and daylight prevents completion of the night passage to Guernsey, I order V 212 to return to St Malo when visibility improves. As poor visibility persists, I arrange a harbour-protection boat at point F 1 [handwritten reading], to bring the troop convoy into St Malo Roads even in poor visibility and full daylight.

09:50: I radio V 212 that a pilot is available. To shorten the discomfort of leave personnel remaining in unsuitable transport ships and get the convoy moving, I arrange escort protection with Fighter Command 3 from 14:15 St Malo–Jersey. This is promised by telephone; I confirm by teletype with expected positions. V 207/06 are ordered to sail at 13:15 to take over H 23 and Maas.

11:50: Harbour Commandant Jersey’s teletype Gkdos 1362 reports that Favorit has run aground south of Grosnez. Remark: Favorit’s departure from Guernsey had not been reported to the convoy office. This again shows that monitoring shipping in the Channel Islands through this office is illusory. Without a departure report, assistance cannot be initiated even if boats are available nearby. The teletype also shows weapons were aboard Favorit; I see this as further confirmation of attempts to evade orders concerning troop and leave transport.

12:00: V 204/05 and M 1202 arrive in St Malo Roads; on enquiry they report seeing nothing of V 212’s convoy. 12:20: I ask V 212 to report its expected position at 14:00 and advise it to expect friendly aircraft, both measures needed to safeguard a convoy whose intentions are unclear. 13:45: V 206/07 sail with the captain and staff aboard. Simultaneously V 212, H 23 and Maas come into sight, having weighed at 11:30. V 207/06 proceed with H 23 and Maas to Jersey after food has been sent aboard for the embarked leave personnel.

14:30: Fighter Command 3’s urgent teletype G 2533/42 refuses close escort for lack of forces, contrary to the verbal assurance, and promises only fighter protection. I can no longer pass this reduction in intended protection to V 207/06 visually. After the morning’s repeated radio messages I refrain from further radio transmission. 14:45: V 204/05/12 enter.

15:00: I discuss the day’s events with all commanders present to establish lessons. V 212’s report shows its seamanship and navigational considerations were sound, but it had not fully appreciated its increased responsibility for the much greater danger to troop transports by day. Lessons: improve direction of lock traffic at St Malo; troop convoys, even at night, must normally be led by two boats; if one boat is impeded, establish immediate mutual communication by every means; report at once to the issuing authority when the situation differs from orders or their assumptions, so that new measures can be taken quickly. The two Siebel ferries sail for Jersey with a navigation warrant officer embarked to ensure safe navigation.

Correction to 4 May, item 2: V 208/09 RO 45 night troop convoy cancelled owing to fog, ready Guernsey; tonnage 4,500 GRT. Situation: V 210/12 ready St Malo, replenish stores; V 208/09 ready Guernsey for RO 45 night troop convoy to St Malo; V 207/06 St Malo–Jersey with H 23 for Jersey and Maas for Guernsey, fighter protection arranged; V 1510/204 Henka, Stade and Hermes Cherbourg–Alderney, returning with Lena, Claus, Gerfried, Schwalbe, Hermes and Baldur; V 204/05 M 1202 Cherbourg–St Malo; V 211 unready St Malo. Tonnage 10,700 GRT.

Intentions for 6 May: V 210/12 ready St Malo for eastward passage; V 208/09 RO 45 night Guernsey–St Malo; V 207/06 Maas night Jersey–Guernsey, then ready; V 1510/213 Iona, Gerfried and Midland Cherbourg–Alderney; V 204/05 ready St Malo for Olwe; V 211 unready St Malo. I report the ferries’ departure under divisional Gkdos 1332 to the division, Commander Security West and Flak Regiment 15. Harbour Commandant Jersey is requested to place the ferries in Albert Roads on 7 May as anti-aircraft protection for the protected vessel, arrange cooperation with shore flak, allot its anchorage, and keep berths available if needed by seven minesweepers of the 2nd Minesweeping Flotilla.

21:00: report that V 206/07 with H 23 and Maas have entered Jersey. 22:00: following divisional G 7390 stressing the urgency of protecting Olwe, I radio V 206/07 to proceed to Cherbourg for that task after releasing Maas and passengers onto boats at Guernsey. The Siebel ferries have entered Jersey after a successful machinery trial passage.

T-1022 Roll 2423, PG 38000, scans 0337–0338.