5 January 1943 Part 3

5 January 1943 Schokland loss report and appended correction

After the troop convoy intended for the night of 4/5 January was divided because of the large number of men on leave, V 212/09 arrived off Corbière at 2330. By searchlight signal to the Harbour Commandant they requested the departure of Holland and Schokland, which had been anchored in Aubin Bay roads on the leading-light line since 1800. V 212/09 steamed towards them along the leading line at slow speed, with navigation lights showing, to collect the convoy as usual west of the shoals approximately south of St Brelade's Bay, rather than in the rocky area. Weather: south-west force 3–4, sea 1–2, visibility 1–3 nautical miles, drizzle showers. The leading-light line and Corbière were visible from sea only intermittently.

About 0050, during a temporary improvement in visibility, Schokland and Holland came into sight with navigation lights showing. At 0100 Schokland twice fired three to four white, red and green stars. Only after a Morse enquiry did Schokland report that she had grounded and request help. V 212 immediately relayed this through Corbière to the Harbour Commandant, adding “Send tug assistance.” After twenty minutes the Morse message was repeated in similar terms. Because of their greater draught, V 212/09 cautiously approached Schokland. She had probably touched the Grande Grune shoal south-west of Noirmont [French chart Île de Jersey 5112 C] and, after sustaining severe damage, sank south-east of the shoal at 0137.

When sinking was observed, V 209 had worked to within one metre of Schokland and was among the men swimming in the water, most of whom were carrying full kit and steel helmets. V 212 was about fifty metres from the sinking position. Both boats drifted with the east-going stream among the shipwrecked men through the rocks south of Aubin Bay to longitude 4°20′ west [chart 5232]. At 0410 the search was abandoned because the boats could not proceed farther east into the shoals. Calls for help could no longer be heard. The boats were secured in St Helier at 0600.

Recovery was very difficult, although all those recovered had lifejackets. Schokland had carried 316 men on leave in addition to 26 crew and anti-aircraft personnel. Recovered: 145, including four recovered north of the island this afternoon; additionally fifteen dead, eight of whom died aboard the patrol boats. [These are the initial figures, subsequently corrected below.] The boats' crews worked with utmost commitment to physical exhaustion. Their commanders' performance in the rock-strewn waters deserves particular recognition.

Observations concerning Schokland: shortly before grounding, when the leading lights became visible, V 209 established that Schokland was south of the transit and showed only her green light. Immediately afterwards she fired the stars described above. The master is unfit for questioning, so his faulty conduct cannot yet be clarified. His statements aboard V 209 were unclear and demonstrated uncertainty about his own position. He was reportedly acting for the regular master. As far as observed, his measures after the accident were unobjectionable. Despite the ship's rapid sinking, the crew calmly launched both boats.

Concerning Sea Transport Officer's assistance: tug assistance requested at 0100 was promised for 0130. At 0140 Schokland's sinking was immediately reported to the St Helier harbour signal station, and departure of harbour-defence boats to rescue the shipwrecked men was repeatedly requested. At 0210 four harbour-defence boats, a Harbour Surveillance motorboat and a tug sailed, apparently without clear orders, because none approached the patrol boats, whose position could always be determined from searchlights and navigation lights. The harbour-defence boats returned to St Helier about 0530 and only received fresh sailing orders at 0850. At 0915 two harbour-defence boats and two tugs sailed towards Corbière. Following a report from an observation post on the island's north side, a tug was directed there and recovered four living men. The direction and execution of assistance appears lacking in energy and a clear objective. [The criticism is the reporting office's assessment.]

Additional measures by the Convoy Control Office: hospital ship Hüxter was ordered ready for sea and moved to Malo roads at 0515. V 207/08 were at immediate readiness in roads. A Group of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla received immediate-readiness orders, which did not take effect because Holland—out of sight since about 0120 according to V 209's commanding officer's telephone report—was sighted off Malo at 0615. V 209/212 were ordered to proceed immediately to Malo and arrived at 1300.

The report concludes: Schokland's grounding was caused by her master's faulty navigation. The scale of losses is attributed to unfavourable weather, strong current, low water temperature, and the practical absence of any assistance by shallow-draught boats in the rocky area. St Malo Convoy Control Office, G 112/43.

Appended secret correction, same reference G 112/43: following renewed enquiries initiated here, amend the numbers aboard and recovered: 310 persons aboard, comprising 26 crew and shipboard anti-aircraft personnel and 284 men on leave and others. Recovered: 174 alive and fifteen dead; therefore missing [printed number partly obscured by folded page; subtraction gives 121]. Patrol boats recovered 170; others four. Chief of 2nd Patrol Boat Flotilla; St Malo Convoy Control Office. These corrected totals differ from both the initial attached report and the diary's early rescue figures; no retrospective harmonisation has been imposed.

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0701–0703, three-page secret war teletype, St Malo Convoy Control Office G 112/43, to Commander, Security Forces West and 3rd Security Division. Handwritten date 5 January 1943 and reference to diary page 10. The appended numerical correction has no separately visible date and is retained with its parent report.