top of page

5 January 1943 Part 2

Summary

Minelaying or minesweeping. Shipping loss or rescue. Air or sea observations

Location Details

Jersey; Guernsey; Alderney; Noirmont Point; St Malo; Granville; Cherbourg; Diélette

Diary Entry

5 January 1943 St Malo Convoy Control Office

Weather: South to south-west force 4–5, sea 2–3, visibility 5 nautical miles. 0145, Guernsey: V 210/703 arrived with Lena from Alderney. 0226, Malo: radio message 0208/13 received from V 209, initially unreadable. 0259, Malo: V 209 supplied the message key for 0208/13: “Schokland sunk. Recovering survivors drifting in the water”; also message 0215/14: “Schokland sunk after grounding south of Noirmont. Recovering survivors. V 212/09.”

Remark: the late transmission of these radio messages after Schokland's sinking—which, according to the commanders' subsequent report, occurred at 0137—was deliberate. Both crews considered recovery of the shipwrecked men the more urgent task, and all assistance possible only from Jersey was requested there.

0300: I immediately telephoned Sea Transport Office Jersey for details, Harbour Commandant Jersey being absent. I established that at 0230 four auxiliary minesweepers, one lifeboat and one tug had sailed to assist. I reported the provisional result to Commander, Security Forces West and 3rd Security Division. 0325, Malo: radio message 0300/19 received: “Convoy abandoned. Proceeding to Jersey with survivors. V 212.” Remark: on receipt, it was assumed here that the entire convoy was returning to Jersey.

0345, Malo: I ordered hospital ship Hüxter to move to the roads. Remark: it was not initially known, and only emerged later, that Schokland had troops aboard. The Jersey hospitals would presumably be overcrowded. I therefore held the hospital ship ready to sail to receive patients if necessary. 0400, Malo: V 207/08 arrived with troop convoy from Guernsey, remaining ready for sea in the roads. 0515, Malo: Hüxter went to the roads. 0600, Jersey: V 212/09 entered with those rescued.

Remark: on telephoning V 209's commanding officer, it emerged that Holland had passed out of sight around 0130 and had not returned to Jersey with them. V 209 had ordered Holland to assist in the rescue, but she rightly declined because she herself carried 250 men on leave. She was then ordered: “Move clear to the north. Make room.” Soon afterwards Holland was no longer seen. I immediately ordered A Group of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla to prepare for sea urgently, and V 207/08, at immediate readiness in the roads, to sail to search for Holland. These orders did not take effect, because Holland was sighted entering from Malo at about 0630. The commanding officers of V 212/09 reported that V 212 had recovered 44 living and two dead, V 209 131 living and six dead. The auxiliary minesweepers that sailed were not seen and did not participate in the rescue. The crews of V 212/09 worked with complete commitment to the point of physical exhaustion. Their commanders willingly assumed responsibility and carried out the rescue conscious of the risk in the rocky area.

0715, Malo: Holland anchored in the roads. Remark: Holland's master later reported that, when he asked for further orders at 0200, Sea Transport Office Jersey told him to “continue with your convoy”, although that office knew the patrol boats were rescuing the men from Schokland. Only after repeated explanations that he had no escort did an order arrive to proceed alone to Malo. At the start of the rescue V 212's commander had asked Sea Transport Office Jersey to have Holland enter Jersey. Neither the Convoy Control Office nor other offices were informed of Holland's onward passage. This created uncertainty about her whereabouts [see remark after 0600]. Moreover, she proceeded alone, without escort or a radio message, with 250 men on leave aboard—entirely unnecessarily had there been a clear overview and clear orders.

0830, Jersey: V 212/09 sailed for Malo. Remark: after their arrival and discussion with their commanders, I submitted a report on the incident; see appended war teletype of 5 January. [Reference in original; the attachment is not reproduced on this page.]

Today's convoy requests: (1) combined convoy Guernsey–Jersey–Granville; (2) combined convoy Malo–Jersey–Guernsey; (3) night troop convoy Lena Guernsey–Alderney; (4) Schwalbe and Hydra Alderney–Cherbourg. Assigned: (1) V 711/22, afterwards to Malo; (2) V 208/07; (3–4) V 210/703. 0840, Guernsey: FK 34/36/38 sailed for Malo. 0845, Malo: V 208/07 sailed with Kochelsee, one tug and two barges for Jersey, one tug and tanker Presto for Guernsey. 0920, Guernsey: V 711/22 sailed with Paul et Janine and Arques for Jersey, Chiemsee, Rabat, Comptoir 51 and Sperber for Granville. 0930, Jersey: ten French fishing cutters sailed for Cherbourg. Remark: the French cutters are ordered to travel only by day. 1115, Jersey: two FK sailed for Granville. 1300, Guernsey: two FK sailed for Jersey. 1315, Jersey: V 711/22 detached Paul et Janine and Arques, continuing to Granville with remaining convoy. 1315, Malo roads: V 212/09 anchored after arriving from Jersey.

Report to 3rd Security Division. Special event: troop transport Schokland grounded and sank near Noirmont Point at 0130 on 5 January while being taken into convoy by V 212/09. About 160 still missing. [This is the contemporary provisional report, not an established final casualty total.]

Corrections to situation for 4 January: item 2 delete Sperber; Oost Vlandern as far as Malo. Item 3 V 207/08 with convoy directly to Malo. Item 6 Tinda returned to Alderney after slight contact with V 210; no damage. Item 7 V 212/09 independently to Jersey to collect Holland and Schokland. Escorted tonnage reduced by 600 GRT.

Situation for 5 January: (1) V 704 coaling at Cherbourg; (2) V 207/08 complete night troop convoy of 4/5 January Guernsey–Malo, then combined convoy Malo–Jersey–Guernsey; (3) V 210/703 complete night troop convoy of 4/5 January Alderney–Guernsey, then night troop convoy of 5/6 January, Lena Guernsey–Alderney, afterwards Schwalbe and Hydra Alderney–Cherbourg; (4) V 213 rest at Cherbourg; (5) V 212/09, after rescuing Schokland survivors, independently Jersey–Malo, then readiness; Holland unescorted Jersey–Malo; (6) V 711/22 combined convoy Guernsey–Jersey–Granville, afterwards independently to Malo; (7) C Group of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla and M 4612 fitting out at Malo. Escorted tonnage: 4,250 GRT.

Intentions for 6 January: (1) V 703 fitting out at Cherbourg; (2) V 207/08 ready at Guernsey; (3) V 210/704 convoy Cherbourg–Alderney; (4) V 213 rest at Cherbourg; (5) V 212/09 with Normand Malo–Granville, then combined convoy Granville–Jersey–Guernsey; (6) V 711/22 evening departure with night troop convoy of 6/7 January Malo–Jersey–Guernsey; (7) C Group of 46th Minesweeper Flotilla and M 4612 fitting out at Malo.

1525, Granville: two FK arrived from Jersey. 1625, Granville: two FK sailed for Jersey. 1630, Malo: Hüxter returned from the roads after her employment proved unnecessary. 1640, Granville: V 711/22 detached remaining convoy and proceeded to Malo. 1640, Jersey: two FK arrived from Guernsey. 1715, Guernsey: V 210/703 sailed with Lena for Alderney; Claus Wilhelm also joined. 1800, Malo: FK 34/36/38 arrived from Guernsey. 1930, Jersey: V 208/07 arrived with convoy from Malo; onward passage abandoned owing to weather. 1935, Malo: V 711/22 arrived from Granville. 2030, Jersey: two FK arrived from Granville. 2030, Alderney: V 210/703 detached Lena and Claus Wilhelm, waiting for Schwalbe and Hydra to sail.

2115, Malo: Harbour Commandant Cherbourg reported nine French fishing cutters had entered Cherbourg at about 1830. Remark: the tenth is assumed to have reached its destination, Dielette, but lack of communications prevents certainty. Enquiry at Cherbourg showed that the Naval Commandant and MNO knew nothing yet of the cutters' arrival. 2130, Cherbourg: six S-boats sailed west. 2200, Alderney: V 210/703 sailed with convoy for Cherbourg. 2320, Malo: Operations Centre Cherbourg telephoned about enemy targets detected in grid BF 3537 north-centre, while convoy V 210/703 was then in BF 3551 east-centre. Remark: I arranged for the Operations Centre to transmit an immediate enemy-detection signal to warn our convoy, expecting it to move closer under the land's protection. Signal sent at 2320/97 on KLW [abbreviation retained]. Draft signed Dr Diederichs; certified correct, Wunderlich, Lieutenant Commander.

Source of Information 

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0688–0690, original pages 9–12. Contemporary reports below contain different timings; these have been retained rather than reconciled retrospectively.

bottom of page