3 December 1942 Part 7

3 December 1942 E boat arrivals and operations at Saint Peter Port

1040. F.d.S. reports that six motor torpedo boats have entered Cherbourg and two Peter Port. The F.d.S. report of results is still outstanding.

1556. The F.d.S. brief report on the torpedo operation against the westbound convoy states that the boats had already started their return passage when action at Start Point was detected at 0541. They then advanced again against the westbound convoy. S 81 and S 116 sank a 2,000-GRT steamer; the sinking was observed. S 82 torpedoed a 2,000-GRT steamer. Its sinking was not observed because an escort destroyer of the Hunt class was torpedoed shortly afterwards. The destroyer sank. The pair S 115 and S 81 was detached to St. Peter Port because of engine failure in S 115. Near Cap de la Hague, ten Spitfires made low-level attacks on this pair: three killed, ten wounded.

1916. If for any reason the boats cannot reach their base before daylight, they should enter emergency harbours wherever possible, since provision of German fighter cover cannot always be guaranteed. I am considering whether the temporary transfer of one or two motor torpedo boat flotillas from the Netherlands area to the west, to Cherbourg, would offer prospects of success by concentrating operations in the western Channel. Above all, I do not want the flotillas to remain there uselessly during foreseeable prolonged bad weather in the Hoofden. Analysis of the weather conditions, using climatological averages, gives the following picture: Hoofden, mean wind force 3.8 and mean sea state 2.26; Channel, mean wind force 3.69 and mean sea state 2.86. The worse sea-state figure for the Channel results from Guernsey, among the observation stations, receiving seas from all directions. If only the figures for the English coast are taken, they are approximately the same as those for the Hoofden. In weather terms, the conditions are therefore equal and do not in themselves justify a promising shift in the concentration of forces. In his comments, F.d.S. considers that concentrating motor torpedo boat operations from the Cherbourg area offers little prospect of success, for the following reasons: 1. Enemy convoys are increasingly routed so that they remain within the secure detection area of Lyme Bay. 2. The convoys comprise only eight or nine steamers and currently sail only every two days. 3. The area and time available for attack are very restricted, unlike the Hoofden, where at present 25–30 steamers sail almost daily. F.d.S. sees an advantage in this transfer only if ice conditions should force the temporary abandonment of the Dutch bases. I share the view of the head of F.d.S. and shall not transfer motor torpedo boats.

T-1022 Roll 4008; PG 37543 | Frame 0014 left, original page 4795; Frame 0014 right, original page 4796; Frame 0014 right and 0015 left, original pages 4796–4797. Extract from T1022_R4008_English_Translation.docx.