28 July 1942 Part 2

28 July 1942 — St Malo Convoy Control Office

Weather: west, light to moderate breeze; visibility 10–12 nautical miles; light precipitation; smooth to slight sea.

03:30, Guernsey — V 712/08 arrived with a convoy from Alderney. 03:50, Jersey — V 213/08 released Schokland and Ad. le Prince off Jersey and continued to Guernsey. 04:25 — A signal rating from V 202 telephoned: after an engagement with British destroyers and gunboats, V 202 had received two underwater hits and, sinking, beached near Cherbourg; part of the crew and the commander had been rescued. Comment: this was my first news of an engagement involving V 203/02, whose radio had probably failed, preventing an urgent report.

04:30 — I telephoned the duty officer of the Commander of Security Forces West and proposed sending fast attack boats from Cherbourg to assist, as nothing was yet known about V 203. 04:40 — I called Sea Commandant Normandy, learned that V 203 was drifting westward on fire, and requested immediate dispatch of rescue boats and tugs. Further conversations established that rescue fast attack boats had sailed from Alderney, fast attack boats were to sail, rescue boats had been requested, and submarine chasers en route to Cherbourg were also to assist.

05:15, Guernsey — V 213/08 arrived with Minotaure and Nordplain from St Malo. 06:00 — V 202’s commander, Leutnant zur See Jacobsen, telephoned, explaining his decision to beach the sinking boat at Naval Signal Station Jobourg and describing the engagement. Ten seriously wounded and fifteen lightly wounded or uninjured men had been rescued, leaving about twenty-five crew missing. He had no detailed information about V 203. I approved his decision, which subsequent discussion showed was well-founded in every respect.

06:25, Guernsey — V 206/11 sailed with Hüxter for Jersey. 06:20 — Teletype from Sea Commandant Normandy, sent at 05:40, confirmed V 202’s commander’s oral report. V 203 had last been seen drifting westward at 05:00. The rescue measures already mentioned were confirmed, with aerial reconnaissance also to begin at daylight. According to this urgent teletype, Army Coastal Battery 706 fired forty-three rounds at a located target between 03:10 and 04:00. 06:45 — I reported my findings to the Commander of Security Forces West; they were already known there. I also stated my intention to go to Cherbourg. 08:15, St Malo — Departure for Cherbourg.

Convoy requests: (1) combined Granville–Jersey–Guernsey; (2) combined Jersey–St Malo; (3) shadow Hüxter Guernsey–Jersey–St Malo; (4) night troop convoy Livadia and Minotaure from Guernsey, joining Ad. le Prince at Jersey for St Malo; (5) night troop convoy Holland and tug Oceanie Guernsey–Alderney. Orders to: (1) M 4605/04, held at Granville after weather prevented the previous day’s convoy; (2) M 4611/01, similarly held at Jersey; (3) V 206/211 as entered on 26 July; (4) V 213/08; (5) V 712/08.

09:10, Granville — M 4605/04 sailed with a combined convoy for Jersey and Guernsey. 10:20, Jersey — V 206/11 arrived with Hüxter from Guernsey. 11:15 — V 206/11 and Hüxter sailed for St Malo. 11:20, Cherbourg — I arrived and visited the wounded and other rescued men in the naval hospital. Fast attack boats had meanwhile brought in wounded and uninjured survivors from V 203. Their accounts provide the picture of the engagement with enemy forces consisting of two destroyers and two gunboats, as recorded in the 2nd Outpost Flotilla’s war diary. Comment: the crews’ conduct met the expectations established in previous actions; courage, readiness for action, prudence and purposeful conduct again showed their unity in combat.

12:30, Cherbourg — V 203 arrived in tow of Georgi with three rescue fast attack boats [typed wording corrected by hand]. 13:00, Jersey — M 4611/01 sailed with the combined convoy for St Malo. 13:00, Cherbourg — V 203 was towed in still burning; burning ammunition continued to detonate intermittently. A group of the FSHD firefighting service began fighting the fire and had extinguished it by about 16:00.

Damage inspection: the fire originated forward. Exploding ammunition tore open the upper deck; the side plating above water was annealed by heat. The forecastle and bridge were completely burnt out. The wooden deck covering had burnt aft to behind the funnel. Depth charges on the foredeck were burnt, but approximately forty depth charges in the bunker beneath remained intact. Several men apparently died forward and below the bridge. Several charred bodies were reported, including one on the bridge, probably that of the commander. Whether the boat could be restored required technical examination. Boiler and engine were serviceable.

16:00 — I visited the wounded in the Luftwaffe hospital. 16:45, Guernsey — M 4605/04 arrived with the combined convoy from Jersey. 17:00, Cherbourg — Discussion with Sea Commandant Normandy about the night’s events, particularly whether V 203 had been fired on from land, as crew members stated. The possibility could not be dismissed.

17:00–19:30 — Visit to V 202’s grounding site at Naval Signal Station Jobourg and to Army Coastal Battery 706. At half tide the boat lay overturned to port and almost completely awash among the rocks; salvage was impossible. The signal watch at Jobourg, one petty officer and nine men, had shown remarkable commitment: they brought V 202’s wounded to the rocks, partly by swimming, and later got them ashore or transferred them to the rescue boat. Men of the nearby infantry also helped. The plotting sketch at Battery 706 made it appear fairly certain that its firing toward the end had hit V 203.

18:30, St Malo — V 206/11 arrived with Hüxter from Jersey. 19:00 — M 4601/11 arrived from Jersey with three tugs and two barges. 21:30, Cherbourg — Commander of the 3rd Security Division arrived at the Harbour Commandant’s office, followed by a short discussion of the engagement and findings.

22:00, Guernsey — V 712/08 sailed with Holland for Alderney. The pair had written orders to take tug Oceanie. Its leader, V 712’s commander, refused because Oceanie was allegedly too slow, at 7–8 knots against the pair’s 8–9 knots. The following tide still had two and a half hours to run. 23:00, Guernsey — V 213/08 sailed with Livadia and Minotaure for Jersey–St Malo.

Report to the 3rd Security Division — special occurrence: V 203/02 attacked by British destroyers and gunboats at Position Carmen [amended]; heavy losses. Correction to 27 July, item 7: Jersey–St Malo return convoy postponed because of weather; escorted tonnage reduced by 2,160 GRT.

Situation for 28 July: (1) V 712/08 completing Alderney–Guernsey with RO 8, Irene, Holland and Georgi, then Guernsey–Alderney with Holland and Oceanie on 28/29 July. (2) V 711/24 St Malo dock. (3) V 203/02 at Position Carmen on 27/28 July; V 203 towed into Cherbourg by Georgi at midday. (4) V 213/08 completing St Malo–Jersey–Guernsey with Schokland, Ad. le Prince, Minotaure and Nordplain, then night troop convoy 28/29 July with Livadia and Minotaure from Guernsey and Ad. le Prince from Jersey to St Malo. (5) V 206/11 shadowing Hüxter Guernsey–Jersey–St Malo. (6) M 4605/04 from Granville with Normand, Comptoir 51 and Pointe à Pitre to Jersey, Helma, Nestor, G. Guynemer and barge 318 to Guernsey. (7) M 4611/01 Jersey–St Malo with three tugs and two barges. Escorted tonnage: 15,100 GRT.

Intentions for 29 July: (1) V 712/08 completing Guernsey–Alderney night troop convoy, then to Cherbourg with Oceanie and any further convoy. (2) V 711/24 undocking and fitting out at St Malo. (3) V 213/08 completing Guernsey–Jersey–St Malo, then readiness. (4) V 206/11 and M 4611/01 St Malo readiness. (5) M 4605/04 Guernsey readiness.

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0424–0425 (original pages 24–27).