27 November 1942 Part 6

27 November 1942 Inspection assessment of Jersey and Guernsey defences and supply

Date note: Assessment recorded on 27 November following the visit of 22–25 November. The praise, criticism of Lothringen, landing assessments and descriptions of foreign workers are those of the German report. Proposed measures are not treated as completed work.

II. Assessment of the coast’s vulnerability to landings

Guernsey: the flat, partly sandy beach of the north-west coast, including Rocquaine Bay, and the east coast on either side of Sampson are suitable for large-scale operations; the latter would require prior occupation of Sark. The steep south coast, difficult to observe and offering numerous isolated small bays, is particularly suitable for commando operations.

Jersey: the west coast, Saint Ouen’s Bay, is particularly suitable for major landings, as is the south-east coast, Royal Bay of Grouville and Saint Clement’s Bay. St Brelade’s Bay, Saint Aubin’s Bay and the steep north coast, with its numerous small bays and ravines, are suitable for commando operations.

On both islands, fortification and garrisoning correspond to this assessment of the coasts.

III. State of fortification construction

On both islands the Organisation Todt and the troops themselves are working tirelessly. Shortages of labour and fuel have a hampering effect, as do the continual special demands placed on the troops by heightened readiness or Alert Stage I. The shortage of guards for the foreign workers also means that the output which would otherwise be possible is not being obtained from them.

Fortification construction is considerably further advanced on Jersey than on Guernsey. The impression is that work on this island is carried out with particular expertise and purpose, and that a particularly knowledgeable and enthusiastic tactical commander has established smooth cooperation with a particularly capable and energetic fortress-engineer commander. The fortress-engineer commander, Colonel Eimler, has since been transferred to the area of the Armed Forces Commander in the Netherlands.

Particularly striking on Jersey are the tactically and technically appropriate fortification of the west coast; the skilful use of old English fortifications, for example the watchtowers; armoured installations very suitably placed in the terrain; the very advanced construction of anti-tank walls; the numerous useful field fortifications; and the advanced construction of tunnels offering sufficient space for supply depots and troops. A considerable number of installations can be expected to be completed by the end of next spring.

On Guernsey, the numerous naval works consuming large quantities of concrete — batteries, observation towers and bearing towers — which are already far advanced, have probably contributed to army installations falling behind. Numerous anti-tank and anti-landing guns still stand in the open. The observation and bearing towers are solidly built, but, being very conspicuous, will draw enemy fire. It is noticeable that the infantry installations, especially field fortifications on the steep south coast, still have little protection against surprise attacks. Modern Tobruk positions are lacking. The construction of anti-tank walls has not yet progressed very far.

The naval battery Lothringen on Jersey provides a grotesque example of inappropriate construction. Its guns stand on high, very conspicuous raised structures so that they can fire over the fire-control post, which had been completed somewhat earlier in the wrong position.

The layout of the provisions and ammunition depots on Jersey makes a very favourable impression.

IV. Matters discussed by the Island Commander Jersey

1. Shortage of forces. The present fortification works correspond to the garrison’s strength. As permanent construction advances, it becomes necessary to leave unmanned installations which are in themselves necessary for defence. The troops are continually under heavy demands. There is no possibility of relief or reinforcement, for example following casualties.

The Jersey commander complains that he had to detach a reinforced company from his own regiment for Alderney, and also an engineer company for Guernsey. He requests the return of these companies. This would weaken the fighting strength of Guernsey, the more exposed island.

2. Requests regarding the organisation of supply troops: two economic or supply companies, expansion of medical services, formal establishment of the sea-transport offices, and so forth. These requests are before Army High Command and have been personally presented there by Major Ziegelmann. A decision must be awaited.

3. The divisional commander requests reversal of the army’s ordered reduction of the horse establishment by 156 horses, since these horses are urgently needed for Machine Gun Battalion 16.

4. There is a shortage of mines and electric lighting cable for the permanent installations.

5. The divisional commander and Island Commander Jersey request development of Carteret harbour sufficiently to permit its use as a supply harbour for the islands. This would substantially shorten the crossing from the mainland to the islands, saving time and fuel. The difficulty is that use of Carteret harbour in its present state is heavily dependent on the tides.

6. Position of the Island Commandant Jersey.

He was originally commander of the Channel Islands. This ceased to apply after the deployment of a division to the islands. He is now Commandant of Jersey and, as such, responsible for its defence. However, the troops stationed on Jersey are subordinate to him only for operational command; in all other matters they are directly subordinate to the divisional commander. Since the Island Commandant Jersey is the responsible tactical commander on the island in the event of fighting, his demand to have responsible involvement in preparing the troops and the island for that fighting — training, organisation, fortification, supply and so forth — is justified.

This would require all combat and supply troops on Jersey to be placed under his command for troop-service matters. He himself would in turn be subordinate in every respect to the commander of the 319th Infantry Division, who is also commandant of all the islands. This would be possible and would not eliminate the divisional commander’s influence on Jersey.

7. The divisional commander and the Jersey commander regard the condition of some foreign Organisation Todt workers as a danger to the troops: severe lice infestation and dirt, with a risk of epidemic disease. They urgently demand that the Organisation Todt be pressed to take appropriate measures.

This deficiency has been reported to the Senior Quartermaster West; his decisions must be awaited.

[The report’s description of the workers and its military priorities are retained as historical source wording. Signature not confidently identified.]

German Seventh Army records, T-312 Roll 1548. T312 Roll 1548 English translation REVIEWED EDITION 4.docx. Local source scans: 1116.jpg, 1117.jpg, 1118.jpg, 1119.jpg, 1120.jpg.