26 June 1940 Part 2

26 June 1940 Plan for occupation of the principal Channel Islands

Naval Commander Northern France. Secret command matter 152/40 [prefix partly cropped]. 26 June 1940. Secret command matter!

To Naval High Command; Naval Group Command West; Commanding Admiral France. For information: Commander, Minesweepers, West; Commander, Torpedo Boats.

Subject: occupation of the principal Channel Islands. Reference: Naval Staff I Operations 8639/40 secret command matter of 20 June 1940.

Aerial reconnaissance of the islands has revealed numerous fortifications on all three islands. Following contact with Air Fleet 2 and the local Army commanders, seizure of the islands by a coup de main [a following phrase is deleted] is not considered expedient, owing to the islands’ geographical extent and for military reasons: absence of surprise and the first taking of possession of English territory.

The following measures are intended.

I. Preparatory measures.

1. The Luftwaffe is requested to keep the Channel Islands sea area and the English south coast under continuous observation.

2. The intelligence station is charged with ascertaining the situation on the islands among civilians, particularly the fishing population.

3. A final conference of all three services—Fourth Army Headquarters, Air Fleet 3, Commander Torpedo Boats, Commander Minesweepers, Naval Commander Northern France—at Admiral France’s headquarters is intended as soon as possible.

4. Assignment of an officer experienced in sea transport, Lieutenant-Commander Kolbe of Naval High Command, is requested.

5. For several days before the operation, air attacks as armed reconnaissance.

6. On the day of execution, aerial reconnaissance and air protection against England from first light. Preliminary sweeps by R-boat flotillas to establish mine-free routes.

7. Preparation of the landing by dive-bomber attacks on battery positions and other identified centres of resistance. Continuous observation of the landing, with dive bombers held ready, including against intervening enemy naval forces (motor torpedo boats). Fighter protection for the landing.

8. Strong anti-aircraft and fighter protection in the assembly area around Cherbourg.

II. Landing forces required.

The following are required from the Army as minimum forces:

1. For Alderney, one infantry battalion with supporting arms, without heavy infantry guns.

2. For Guernsey, two infantry battalions with supporting arms, without heavy infantry guns.

3. For Jersey, three infantry battalions with supporting arms, without heavy infantry guns.

4. In addition, two engineer companies in all.

5. Incorporation of the Naval Assault Detachment Gotenhafen.

Plan for occupation — shipping and execution

Since these landing forces require a considerable amount of shipping, division of the task into two stages on two separate days—first Alderney–Guernsey, second Jersey—will be unavoidable.

To secure possession of the islands, anti-aircraft artillery capable of engaging air and sea targets must be taken along. The anti-aircraft guns and light infantry weapons are to be loaded with the engineer companies’ equipment.

III. Execution.

1. Overall direction: Naval Commander Northern France. One liaison officer each from the Luftwaffe, Army, anti-aircraft artillery, Commander Torpedo Boats and Commander Minesweepers is to be attached to his staff.

2. Command at sea: Commander Minesweepers, who will also command the Guernsey–Alderney group. Commander of the Jersey group: Commander Torpedo Boats. Command after landing: Army.

Successful execution of the task depends entirely on provision of suitable shipping. Coastal vessels and tugs are available only in very limited numbers, and are unmanned, unarmed and not worked up. Given the exceptionally difficult navigation and tidal conditions and the enemy opposition to be expected, experienced commanders and crews are required.

The landing is intended in two waves. First wave: infantry assault detachments in S-boats and R-boats. Second wave in patrol boats: the bulk of the infantry with light weapons and anti-aircraft artillery.

Larger ships and those of greater draught are unusable owing to the harbour conditions. A speed of 12 knots is desirable because of the strong currents.

After preparations are complete, the timing of execution depends on the weather.

After occupation of the islands, anti-aircraft artillery is to provide artillery protection of the harbour installations against both sea and air targets. An air-reporting service is to be established. A radio link with the mainland is to be established. Further protection by fighters from the mainland.

Because surprise is lacking and so many arms of all the services are involved, execution of the task requires the most thorough preparation.

[Handwritten routing: for the files; signature and initials.]

T-1022 Roll 2439, T1022_R2439_English_Translation.docx. Archive and frame references follow.
PG 38019 | Frame 00761, original sheet 15, first page
PG 38019 | Frame 00762, original sheet 16, continuation