26 July 1943 Part 1

26 July 1943 Channel Islands Sea Defence diary

Weather: wind 360°, 2 m/sec. At 03:43 and 04:15, Ozet Cherbourg reported enemy targets in grid square B.F. 3575, changing course, without speed data.

04:20. Sea-target alarm for Group Guernsey. The naval radar sets on Guernsey had no contacts. The Jersey naval radar set detected only friendly M-boats between Jersey and Guernsey. The Luftwaffe set likewise detected friendly M-boats and some uncertain distant contacts north of the island which could not be connected with them.

05:05. Sea-target alarm for Group Guernsey ended.

Because neither the naval nor Luftwaffe radar sets in the islands had obtained enemy contacts, apart from a few uncertain plots, the Cherbourg plotting centre’s messages were initially inexplicable. The M-boats detected by Jersey radar were questioned after entering Guernsey; they had neither heard nor seen enemy craft. Telephone consultation with the centre nevertheless established unambiguous plotting evidence for an enemy formation, necessarily detected from the mainland. This again showed that the naval radar sets on the forward Channel Islands were not fulfilling their task. If the centre’s information was correct, which was not doubted, enemy craft had remained within the coastal artillery’s area without being noticed or engaged. The urgent need to replace the local radar equipment was again demonstrated. The Alderney radar set was unserviceable.

Undated subsequent assessment by the Commanding Admiral Channel Coast concerning the 26 July entry, page 79, 04:20 and 05:05; Naval Staff registry 1750/43–54.

According to Ozet Normandy's report on the Jersey radar contacts of 26 July, the target north of Jersey in grid square Bruno Fritz 3575 was correctly identified as hostile from the outset both by Ozet itself and by the St Malo convoy-control station. The failure to inform the Sea Commander, Channel Islands, immediately by the fastest means, contrary to standing orders, was an Ozet error. Direct enquiries by the Sea Commander to an equipment operator served no purpose because the operator was not informed of the target classification.

Co-operation between the Sea Commander, Channel Islands, and Ozet Normandy was particularly impaired by poor and failure-prone landline communications. Improvement depended upon completion of the planned islands-to-mainland cable, again delayed by shortages of materials. As an interim solution, Group West Command Staff A6 had agreed that an attempt should be made to establish a decimetre-band voice link between the Sea Commander and Ozet Normandy; the corresponding application to Naval High Command had been initiated.

T-1022 Roll 2422, scans 0675, 0677.