24 June 1942 Part 4

24 June 1942 Colonel Lamey’s report on visiting the 319th Infantry Division on Jersey and Guernsey

[Scan 1045.jpg] Lamey, Colonel on the General Staff. 24 June 1942. Report on the visit to 319th Infantry Division on the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. [Handwritten: Return! General Heusinger; further annotation partly unclear, dated 30 June.]

Organisational development, both in command and supply, has taken forms on the Channel Islands that require fundamental change. Since supplying the islands plays a decisive part and substantially influences command, its reorganisation is urgent. This also entails a fundamental change in troop employment.

At present there is one tactical command post on each island. The Commander of the Channel Islands commands on Jersey, and the divisional commander on Guernsey. Jersey is subordinate to Guernsey, although overall command originally emanated from Jersey. As the larger island and, owing to its structure, the more difficult to defend, Jersey is the focal point of the overall defence of the Channel Islands. That means that if the division holds overall command it belongs on Jersey. Why this is not so cannot be assessed. It undoubtedly results from the historical development of the defensive organisation. The “Commander of the Channel Islands”, who was appointed first, went to Jersey.

The division’s influence on the conduct of battle on the islands is slight, since the connection between the islands crosses nearly 50 km of water, requiring three hours’ passage or more. [Scan 1046.jpg] Communication from the mainland to the islands and between them also depends on wind, weather and tides. It is irregular and uncertain for days at a time. Mutual support in battle is thus scarcely conceivable, even from the mainland.

The division’s influence on preparations for battle, such as construction and stockpiling, is likewise limited by distance. The emerging or reviving independence of the commander on Jersey, and the importance of the two personalities, visibly complicate overall command. The Jersey commander’s staff is small. A great workload falls directly upon the commander. Divisional headquarters is staffed as a thirteenth-wave division, with all specialist officers. The divisional commander is relieved of workloads.

Of the islands themselves, however, the greater and more decisive construction task undoubtedly lies on Jersey. There is a kind of competitive spirit between the two islands, which is not in itself bad and, depending on the energy of the commander, leads to faster construction; but it also creates a certain antagonism which, as already indicated, adversely affects command. Construction is otherwise astonishingly far advanced. Organisation Todt’s labour force is large and relieves the fighting troops of much work.

The supply organisation is arranged as follows. [Scan 1047.jpg] The Ib supply officer, with all specialist officers, is at divisional headquarters on Guernsey. From there he directs the entire supply service. Locating the headquarters on Guernsey is awkward. He should be on the mainland. In addition each island has its so-called “island Ib”, regulating supply on that island. Baking and slaughtering take place on each island. Each has its own ammunition, fuel and food reserve depots.

These depots are all very well laid out, partly splinterproof and almost bombproof in old casemates. On Jersey, tunnels are being constructed at great expense to receive supplies, with 20 metres or more of undisturbed ground above them. The divisional supply commander is at Granville. There he controls his supply columns, the small motor-transport columns and horse-drawn columns formed from draught teams released from combat vehicles.

With these columns, however, the supply commander works more for corps headquarters, 320th Infantry Division or other offices of other armed services than for the division itself. In place of the unavailable divisional supply commander’s columns, the division has hired motor vehicles on the islands and assembled them into columns. Thus a duplicated organisation exists. Some divisional horses have been inactive on the mainland for months. They must be cared for, depriving the troops of fighting men. The motor vehicles need additional drivers, likewise withdrawn to some extent from defence. This duplication [Scan 1048.jpg] adversely affects the division’s fighting strength.

On the mainland there is also a supply staff based at Saint-Malo, with branches at Granville and Cherbourg. This staff, in a sense a second divisional supply commander, performs the duties of a transport officer. Bulk goods such as building materials leave from Saint-Malo; smaller transports from Granville and Cherbourg. As already stated, transports are irregular and shipping capacity is insufficient to meet requirements. Construction falters when weather or other causes prevent regular crossings.

It is unnecessary to point out that loading and unloading supplies consumes a disproportionately large workforce. The supply company is insufficient, so a second supply company has been subordinated to the division. The numerous depots on the islands and many distribution points, which a division normally has only once or at most twice, require an enormous number of guards. The position and structure of the islands demand the widest possible decentralisation: poor camouflage opportunities, no woodland! The two attached Landesschützen companies are insufficient. Troops must be used, weakening fighting strength.

Alongside Army, Navy and Luftwaffe offices and the command posts on Jersey and Guernsey, there are also Military Commander’s offices which are entirely unnecessary, since their duties could easily be performed additionally by the command authorities on the two islands.

[Scan 1049.jpg] Finally, troop morale suffers from the impossibility of relief and the small prospect of ever leaving the island—that is, of becoming permanently stationed there. A young officer commanding a strongpoint told me frankly that it was enough to make one puke, sitting in the same place for one and a half years without any prospect of ever being employed elsewhere. The divisional leadership’s mood is likewise dominated by fear of becoming static. The division sees itself as a field division called upon for other employment as well.

The Jersey commander, by contrast, is naturally fully attuned to permanent stationing. He is therefore wholeheartedly devoted to the task. The success of construction on Jersey is obvious proof. All these reasons prompt the following proposal for total reorganisation:

1. The “Commander of the Channel Islands” alone commands the islands on a permanent basis. His staff is to be expanded accordingly. 2. He is given a static supply organisation. The enclosure is only a sketch and requires detailed calculation. This supply organisation also includes military-administration officials. 3. The troops do not constitute one formation such as a field division, which is not appropriately organised at all, but individual suitably equipped and armed units: naval artillery regiments and battalions, fortress-engineer battalions, Army fortress artillery, fortress anti-tank companies, Landesschützen battalions, civilian transport columns and the like. As far as possible [Scan 1050.jpg] they should be relieved from time to time. They bring no supply establishments with them. 4. The division is to be withdrawn and rehabilitated, insofar as elements are not required to form the units named.

This arrangement would have the following advantages: 1. Command emanates from a single authority; dual leadership is eliminated. 2. Permanence of the command authorities ensures exact knowledge of the special conditions. 3.319th Infantry Division is released and can be usefully employed in coastal defence elsewhere, as Army Command has requested. 4. The present overlapping organisations consume unnecessarily large forces; these too would be released for actual fighting by rationalisation. 5. Coastal defence would be substantially strengthened.

The preceding considerations on command have not included Sark and Alderney. Sark is too small and insignificant. Alderney is farther from Guernsey than Jersey. To save forces and simplify command arrangements, this island could even be placed under 320th Infantry Division. In conclusion, the proposal merely presents ideas discussed without commitment with the divisional commander and island commander during my visit. It still requires detailed consideration and calculation. It [Scan 1051.jpg] arose from the recognition that forces are employed on the islands which, owing to distorted development, lie uselessly disorganised, while urgently needed elsewhere. Army Command itself has repeatedly expressed the intention and wish to insert a division into Brittany’s coastal defence. Since shortage of troops has prevented fulfilment of its wishes, I could imagine the proposed “self-help” achieving the object. Lamey.

[Scan 1052.jpg] Enclosure: Static supply organisation. On the mainland: Commander of the Channel Islands, simultaneously troop commander; supply staff corresponding to a divisional supply commander, with supply-office and weapons-service symbols. Transport columns supplied as required by Army or corps headquarters; shipping capacity as required. On the islands: Guernsey—Ib supply officer and supply commander; Jersey—Ib supply officer and supply commander; Alderney—Ib supply officer and supply commander, correspondingly on the smallest scale. Guernsey and Jersey show transport, bakery, butchery and associated supply-service symbols; MV=military administration, VA=provisioning office, Wa=weapons service. [Chart reproduced below.]

Original source image 1052.jpg — T-78 Roll 317. Colonel Lamey’s report on visiting the 319th Infantry Division on Jersey and Guernsey.

German Army High Command records, T-78 Roll 317. Supplied English translation T78_Roll_317_English_Translation.docx. Source images: 1045.jpg, 1046.jpg, 1047.jpg, 1048.jpg, 1049.jpg, 1050.jpg, 1051.jpg, 1052.jpg.