24 August 1943 Part 2

24 August 1943 Friendly fire and the subsequent Admiral assessment

Undated subsequent assessment by the Commanding Admiral Channel Coast of the 24 August incident. Naval Staff registry 2055/43. Signed for the Admiral by the Chief of Staff; signature unclear. Placed with the incident, without assigning an issue date.

Under paragraph 2407 of B.u.M. Flak regulations, once an aircraft had unmistakably been identified as hostile, fire was to be opened immediately when it entered the effective range. The Sea Commander’s anti-aircraft order made the anti-aircraft control officer responsible for immediate fire against hostile aircraft. Battery weapons normally joined in only after that officer had opened fire with his own gun. Large batteries were to appoint several such officers, who could also be gun commanders and could then open fire independently.

Batterie Strassburg's battle instruction also permitted gun posts to open fire independently once an aircraft had unmistakably been identified as hostile and was within effective range. This was a valid supplement to the Sea Commander's order and ensured an immediate response to surprise low-level attacks.

The loss of the friendly fighter was attributed solely to the culpable conduct of the gun commander who opened fire first. Before firing, he had to establish beyond doubt whether the approaching machines were friendly or hostile; particular caution was required because the crews had received the departure report for the friendly aircraft.

The fact that the aircraft approached St Peter Port directly, contrary to regulations, did not justify identifying them as hostile without observing the other recognition rules. Responsibility therefore rested with the gun commander who first opened fire. At the request of the local court martial, the Commanding Admiral's staff had submitted a corresponding opinion on the factual report against the battery commander.

Translator’s note: this assessment accepts the battery’s supplementary instruction and assigns responsibility solely to the first gun commander, whereas the Sea Commander’s diary also blames the battery commander. The two contemporary conclusions are kept distinct.

T-1022 Roll 2422, scans 0696–0697.