20 September 1942 Part 2

20 September 1942 St Malo Convoy Control Office

Weather: South-west to west, strong to near-gale wind, gusty; cloudy to overcast, isolated precipitation; visibility 8–10 nautical miles; strong coastal haze in the morning and a powerful south-westerly swell.

0120, Guernsey: V 710/24 arrived with convoy from Alderney. 0200, Malo: V 212/08/M 4611 sailed with La France carrying troops, RO 21, Robert Müller 8, Nordplain and Roslea for Guernsey. 0500, Alderney: V 209/07 sailed with convoy for Cherbourg. 0740, Cherbourg: V 209/07 arrived with convoy from Alderney. 0910, Guernsey: V 212/08/M 4611 arrived with convoy from Malo. Because departure from Malo was delayed—the convoy was scheduled for 0100—and because Roslea, newly employed in Channel traffic, was too slow, the troop convoy reached its destination only after daybreak.

Frigattenkapitän Dr Diederichs again takes charge of the Convoy Control Office.

Requests for 20 September: (1) Gabes, Nestor and Diamant, Granville–Guernsey; (2) escort a Krupp bridge in three sections, each mounted on three motor vessels, Cherbourg–Alderney; first section on 21 September. I assign M 4605/04 to (1), first independently Malo–Granville. For (2), V 209/07 and V 710/24, the latter to proceed independently Guernsey–Cherbourg, together with UJ 1407/01 placed at our disposal by 3rd Security Division on request. I also send V 713/02 Malo–Cherbourg for the Cherbourg-area tasks, since I intend recalling V 209/07 to Malo after their task. The tugs Volkmar, for the bridge convoy to Cherbourg, and G. Guynemer, for Jersey, join V 713/02.

Order, secret command teletype 775: To Sea Commandant Normandy (Sea Transport Office); information to Commander, Security Forces West, 3rd Security Division and Harbour Commandant Alderney. For the weather-dependent Krupp bridge convoy on 21 September: (1) V 209/07/710/24 undertake escort, led by V 209’s commanding officer. (2) UJ 1407/01 provide northern flank protection, offset 3–5 nautical miles depending on visibility. Establish agreement between V 209’s commander and the protective pair about listening watch, signal communications and so forth. (3) Departure 2130 from Cherbourg. (4) Harbour Commandant Cherbourg is asked to ensure preparations are as inconspicuous as possible and tugs are put alongside the tow only after dark. (5) Report departure through the Naval Signals Officer by short radio message. (6) Boats must ensure the fastest possible reporting of any enemy contact. (7) Commander, Security Forces West is asked to arrange immediate readiness of the E-boats at Cherbourg until the tow’s arrival at Alderney is reported under item 8. (8) On arrival at Alderney, V 209 reports by short radio message: “Müller as ordered.” (9) After the tow arrives at Alderney, the submarine chasers patrol off the harbour entrance until daybreak, then enter Alderney. (10) V 209’s commanding officer orders the opening of fire, taking item 9 into account. Convoy Control Office Malo, secret command matter 775.

1325, Malo: M 4605/04 sailed for Granville with the commander of 46th Minesweeping Flotilla aboard.

The following was sent to 3rd Security Division. Correction to 19 September: Item 7: M 4602 went to Jersey, then with a combined convoy Jersey–Malo, rather than to Guernsey. Corrected tonnage: 13,800 GRT.

Situation for 20 September: (1) V 209/07 with Spinel, Tinda and Schwalbe Alderney–Cherbourg, then rest; (2) V 212/08/M 4611 complete the night troop convoy of 19/20 September Malo–Guernsey with La France, Nordplain, RO 21, Robert Müller 8 and Roslea, then readiness; (3) V 710/24 complete the night troop convoy of 19/20 September Alderney–Guernsey with RO 8, Claus and Iris, then readiness; (4) V 707/05 rest at Malo; (5) V 713/02: H 2 convoy postponed until further notice because of renewed MES damage; in the evening sail from Malo with Guynemer for Jersey and Volkmar for Cherbourg; (6) M 4605/04 independently Malo–Granville, then Diamant, Nestor and Gabes Granville–Guernsey; (7) M 4601/02 rest at Malo. Escorted tonnage: 5,300 GRT.

Intentions for 21 September: (1) V 710/24 independently Guernsey–Cherbourg for task (2); (2) V 209/07/710/24 night bridge convoy Cherbourg–Alderney under secret teletype 775 [the second number in this line is overtyped]; (3) UJ 1407/01 protection for (2); (4) V 713/02 complete Malo–Cherbourg with Volkmar for the bridge convoy, then local tasks; (5) V 212/08/M 4611 night troop convoy of 21/22 September Guernsey–Malo; (6) V 707/05 rest at Malo; (7) M 4605/04 ready at Guernsey; (8) M 4602/01 combined convoy Malo–Jersey.

1645, Granville: M 4605/04 took over Gabes for Jersey, Diamant and Nestor for Guernsey. 1825, Malo: V 713/02 sailed with Volkmar for Cherbourg and G. Guynemer for Jersey. 2014, Jersey: Because of the weather, M 4605/04 released Gabes and Nestor off Jersey and continued with Diamant towards Guernsey. At Corbière the commander of 46th Minesweeping Flotilla decided to enter Jersey because of the weather. An extract from his war diary is attached. 2100, Malo: Tug G. Guynemer returned because of the weather. 2235, St Helier: M 4605/04 entered. 2240, off St Helier, at Dog Nest: Diamant ran aground while entering.

Remark: Telephone discussion with Sea Transport Office Jersey could not establish the cause of Diamant’s grounding. Taking the weather and my local knowledge into account, I form the following opinion: with strong swell and sea and a near-gale following wind, Diamant probably passed beyond the entrance alignment, the Albert Pier red/green light, at excessive speed. It remains incomprehensible that her master was not prompted to turn in time by M 4604, about 300 metres ahead and clearly visible in the good visibility. Thus—perhaps also without sufficiently vigorous astern action—she ran aground at Dog Nest on the wrong west–east entrance line. [This is the diary writer’s provisional assessment, not an established investigation finding.]

2315, St Helier: Two harbour-protection boats sailed with pilots to assist Diamant.

Signed: Dr Diederichs.

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0517–0518, original pages 7–10.