20 June 1940 Part 3

20 June 1940 Order to occupy the major Channel Islands and Ouessant — page 1

Naval High Command, Naval Staff. Berlin, 20 June 1940. Reference 1/SkI. Io 8639/40, secret command matter.

To Naval Commander Northern France; Naval Commander Brittany. For information: Armed Forces High Command (L), Wolfsschlucht; Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe, Operations Staff (Asien); Army General Staff; Admiral France; Naval Group Command West; North Sea Naval Station Command; Naval Liaison Officer with Army General Staff; Naval Liaison Officer with Fourth Army Headquarters; Commander, Torpedo Boats, Operations; Führer’s adjutant, Commander von Puttkamer; As to II (copy); IL. [Receipt stamp and handwritten routing marks.]

Subject: Occupation of the major Channel Islands and the island of Ouessant.

The speedy occupation of the three major British-held Channel Islands, Alderney, Guernsey and Jersey, and of the French island Ouessant, is necessary.

In enemy hands, the British Channel Islands constitute a far-forward enemy observation post on our flank, to the detriment of our naval and air operations in the central and western Channel. Ouessant is of great importance as a principal landfall for shipping and for air forces.

According to present information, enlargement of the obsolete defences on the Channel Islands is not to be expected. Nothing is known of defensive installations on Ouessant.

On Jersey, an old casemated fort is intended to protect St Helier harbour; it allegedly has seven guns of doubtful fighting value facing south.

Order to occupy the islands — intelligence and execution

Little is known about the defences of St Peter Port harbour on Guernsey; their fighting value is doubtful.

Nothing is known about defensive installations on Alderney, although in 1939 attention was drawn to the island’s importance as a base for submarine chasers and motorboats. If St Anne harbour there has been used for this purpose, improvised defences are to be expected.

All three islands have airfields which were used in peacetime. The airfield on Alderney is said to have been taken over and enlarged by the RAF.

It is not to be assumed that, in view of the rapid development of the situation in northern France, the enemy has had time to strengthen the islands’ defences, or that he had already begun such measures with foresight at the outbreak of war.

Details of the present situation on the islands must be obtained by aerial reconnaissance or by thorough questioning of prisoners, fishermen or coastal mariners on the west coast of the Norman peninsula.

The Channel Islands and Ouessant should preferably be occupied simultaneously by elements of the naval assault detachments in northern France. Support by Army and Luftwaffe forces should be arranged with the local commanders of those services. The crossing to the islands would have to be made in requisitioned coastal vessels or tugs from the sea areas concerned. Light weapons appear necessary to facilitate establishment of a bridgehead and to repel enemy aircraft which might intervene. Luftwaffe support for the landing appears advisable in any event. The form and strength of that support will depend on the reconnaissance results concerning the islands’ defences and garrison strength. To obtain a measure of [continued].

Order to occupy the islands — command and reporting

[Continued:] artillery defence after occupation, consideration should be given to transferring captured guns at the same time or later.

Immediate occupation and, if necessary, extinguishing of the lights on the islands, and establishment of an air-reporting and communications link with the hinterland, are important.

Assuming Armed Forces High Command’s approval of Army and air support, Naval Commanders Northern France and Brittany are entrusted with carrying out the operation within their respective areas of responsibility. They are to request the support they consider necessary directly from the local commanders of the other services. If participation by forces of Commander, Torpedo Boats (S-boats), should prove advisable for taking the British Channel Islands, Naval Commander Northern France is to contact Commander, Torpedo Boats directly. If Group West considers it necessary, it may provide assistance in preparation and execution by augmenting the staff.

Intentions are to be reported briefly to Naval Staff and the authorities listed in the distribution, excluding Armed Forces High Command and the Commanders-in-Chief of Army and Luftwaffe. Naval Staff will inform those three authorities.

By order. Draft signed: Schniewind. Certified correct: [signature], government inspector. Naval High Command seal.

T-1022 Roll 2439, T1022_R2439_English_Translation.docx. Archive and frame references follow.
PG 38019 | Frame 00757, original sheet 11, document page 1
PG 38019 | Frame 00758, original sheet 12, document page 2
PG 38019 | Frame 00759, original sheet 13, document page 3