2 November 1941 Part 2

2 November 1941 Operations Branch requirements for permanent defence of the Channel Islands

[Scan 1078.jpg] Secret command matter. Operations Branch (V), no. 38064/41. 2 November 1941. Three copies; copy 2. Reference: Commander-in-Chief West/Army Group Command D, Ia/General of Engineers, no. 242/41, 13 October 1941. To General of Engineers and Fortifications attached to Commander-in-Chief Army. Operations Branch broadly agrees with the proposals for permanent construction of the Channel Islands forwarded under the above reference. In preparing the final tactical and technical design now ordered, please consider the following points.

I. Enemy. The enemy behaviour on which construction must be based follows from the captured British instructions for landing operations (Army General Staff/Foreign Armies West, no. 4945/41 secret, 29 October 1941) and the report of experience on Crete. For the latter, the British are to be assumed as attackers. In particular, the captured instructions contain the following details not yet fully allowed for in the existing design: (a) simultaneous surprise landings at several points by specially composed troops of varying strength in the first wave are considered the rule; (b) tanks and armoured landing boats are employed in the first wave; (c) the first landing always takes place in darkness, with light warships tasked particularly to silence the defender’s searchlights; (d) the first landing will often be forced at places the defender considers unsuitable. Experience on Crete shows that even in generally unsuitable terrain, it is possible, accepting heavy losses, to parachute successfully into a prepared enemy and destroy him.

[Scan 1079.jpg] II. Garrison strength and weapons employment. 1. Present island garrisons appear in the enclosure. They allow for decisive defence on the basis of reinforced field works, partly still under construction. Armed Forces High Command has particularly stressed that, beyond the authorised strength of a first-wave division, the islands must contain: (a) approximately one battalion of heavily armoured tanks; (b) strong light artillery; (c) very heavy flat-trajectory and high-angle batteries, partly fixed and partly mobile reserves; (d) assault guns; (e)5 cm anti-tank guns and other powerful calibres suitable for anti-tank defence; (f) heavy infantry weapons and flamethrowers; (g) sufficient mines to make possible landing places impassable in the greatest density and depth. Formation or delivery of these units and weapons is partly still in progress.

2. In calculating the eventual garrison strength, it should be examined whether static troops organised like fortress brigades, with a special table of personnel and equipment, would be expedient. Field troops of a strength still to be fixed could be attached as counterattack reserves as required. The static troops should be especially strongly equipped with heavy infantry weapons, flamethrowers, heavy anti-tank guns and artillery. 3. Requirements for fixed artillery must be determined locally in close collaboration among Army, naval and anti-aircraft artillery authorities, aiming at broad overlap of tasks. The coastal artillery currently [Scan 1080.jpg] employed must be replaced as soon as possible by fixed German-designed guns.

4. The mobile artillery at the island commandant’s disposal is to be strong. One light and one heavy artillery battalion on each of Guernsey and Jersey are considered necessary. Protected accommodation must be provided. A reserve of equipment is considered necessary in case the islands are cut off. 5. The counterattack reserve must be strong and equipped sufficiently to engage a powerful airborne enemy at several places and intervene in the battle for the coastline.

III. Conduct of battle and consequences for weapons employment and construction. 1. Construction must allow for an airborne landing forced through by ruthless employment of a temporarily superior air force, simultaneously with an infantry landing supported by a superior fleet’s heavy fire, very heavy tanks from landing barges, and amphibious and submersible tanks. 2. The coastline must under all circumstances be held against an enemy landing from the sea. Landing attempts must collapse before reaching the coast. An enemy who nevertheless gains a foothold must be fought from a system of deeply echeloned resistance nests and destroyed by counterstroke. Existing coastal defence remains too linear.

3. Withdrawal before a landing enemy is impossible because of insufficient depth. Against airborne enemy, Operations Branch approves two additional defensive lines as rallying positions inland. These must form a zone of all-round-defensible strongpoints, overlaid by individual strong permanent works to ensure occupation and readiness to fire. [Scan 1081.jpg] Coastal-defence construction takes priority over rear lines. 4. Against airborne enemy and an enemy established on the coast, the decision must be sought by immediate counterattack with tank support and concentrated artillery. Firing positions, artillery positions, approach routes, etc.must be built accordingly. The counterattack groups, their tanks and motorised guns require readiness accommodation protected against the heaviest naval shelling and aerial bombs.

5. Since airborne enemy may come from every direction, the firing positions of the most important guns, including anti-aircraft guns, must be enclosed in strongpoints and themselves prepared for all-round defence. The design does not meet this requirement. 6. The number of installations must allow uninterrupted coastal surveillance by night, in poor visibility, natural fog or artificial smoke. The number proposed does not appear quite sufficient. 7. The most important installations must withstand individual hits from the heaviest naval guns and bombs. Installations chiefly intended to fight assault troops landed by sea or air may be designed on the assumption that shortly after landing these troops will not yet possess the heaviest assault weapons, apart from shaped charges. Such works can therefore be weaker. Works with restricted fields of fire (casemates) must permit rapid evacuation; flank or rear attacks must be fought from prepared open positions beside the fighting installation. All-round observation must be assured.

[Scan 1082.jpg] 8. Coastal strongpoints are generally intended to be armed with 7.5 cm weapons. Eastern campaign experience shows this calibre inadequate against the heaviest tanks. Larger calibre is to be sought. Anti-tank and gun casemates must allow for the continual growth of anti-tank weapons. At the most threatened points, flanking anti-tank defence will have to be supplemented by rapid-firing large-calibre anti-tank guns under armour, with a wide traverse. 9. The calculated number of mortars appears very small compared with flat-trajectory guns. The special cliff-coast formation and, in places, deeply dissected island terrain require particularly numerous mortars.

10. Special surveillance of airfields and terrain suitable for parachute or glider landings is stressed again. This ground must be covered from fighting installations. Tanks must stand by under cover for immediate action. Protection of airfields by ground personnel is insufficient. Runways must be defensible; they are as vulnerable as the coastline. Arrangements for rapid destruction and obstruction of runways must be provided. 11. Attention is drawn to the possibility of defeating coastal landing attempts with underwater obstacles, mines and floating fire.

IV. Construction priorities. 1. The islands’ importance determines the following order: (a) Guernsey and Alderney; (b) Jersey; (c) Sark and Chausey. 2. Within this order, the particularly threatened areas to be fortified first are [Scan 1083.jpg] (a) Guernsey’s north, west and southwest; (b) Alderney’s northern part; (c) Jersey’s western part. 3. Most urgent are bombproof emplacement of the heaviest flat-trajectory guns against sea targets; securing the most threatened coastal sectors against landings of the heaviest tanks; and securing airfields and their surroundings against airborne enemy.

V. Individual remarks. 1. Planning of air bases on the islands must include the Army’s and Navy’s required reconnaissance and artillery-observation aircraft. 2. Employment of searchlights against sea targets, for air defence and to illuminate the coastline requires clear joint regulation and strict organisation and command, since all three armed services are involved. 3. The island signals network must suit the varied requirements of all three services. The command and reporting network must assume that all armed-forces elements on the islands, except operational Luftwaffe units, are subordinate to the Army-appointed island-group commandant. Central control of artillery combat against sea targets must be possible. Each island commandant must likewise direct his island’s defence firmly from a central point. [Signature unclear.]

[Scan 1084.jpg] Reverse/file annotation: Operations Branch (V), no. 38064/41 secret command matter. [Remaining short annotation indistinct.]

German Army High Command records, T-78 Roll 317. Supplied English translation T78_Roll_317_English_Translation.docx. Source images: 1078.jpg, 1079.jpg, 1080.jpg, 1081.jpg, 1082.jpg, 1083.jpg, 1084.jpg.