19 November 1942 Part 6

19 November 1942 St Malo Convoy Control Office

Weather: Light winds around north-east, overcast to cloudy; visibility five nautical miles; sea 1–2; early haze and areas of fog.

0045, Jersey, Corbière Point: V 711/29 released La France to enter harbour and signalled R 104 by Morse to join convoy.

Remark: The convoy commander, commanding officer of V 711, assumed that an R-boat could join without particular difficulty. In view of the embarked troops, he therefore did not wait after R 104 had understood his invitation to join. In fact, raising the anchor with R 104’s hand windlass took considerable time. Her commanding officer, unfamiliar with local waters, missed the convoy despite good visibility and anchored again in St Aubin’s Bay roads after searching for three hours.

0315, Granville: V 207/12 released convoy, which could immediately pass through the lock, and proceeded to Malo. 0415, Guernsey: V 711/29 arrived with convoy from Malo. 0440, Malo: V 207/12 anchored in roads from Granville.

Requests: (1) Ad. le Prince in tow of Balidar and Nungesser Malo–Cherbourg; (2) night troop convoy Midsland Alderney–Guernsey; (3) night troop convoy Minotaure and Holland from Guernsey, La France from Jersey to Malo; (4) R 104 Jersey–Guernsey; (5) route sweeping with SSG Malo–Corbière–Granville. Orders: (1) V 209/10; (2) V 712/22, proceeding independently Cherbourg–Alderney; (3) V 711/29; (4) R 104 ordered to join two HS-boats; (5) C group of 46th Minesweeping Flotilla.

Meanwhile a combined convoy Malo–Jersey is requested. I radio M 4605/04/02 to proceed to Malo for this task after route sweeping.

M 4600/06/01 intend to anchor at Îles Chausey. 0645, Malo: V 209/10 sailed with convoy for Cherbourg. 1000, Jersey: M 4600/01/06/05/04/02 sailed for route sweeping with SSG towards Granville. On receiving radio orders M 4605/04/02 proceeded immediately to Malo.

The following was sent to 3rd Security Division. Correction to situation for 18 November: item 2, Comptoir 51 and Tourane also from Jersey to Granville; item 3, without R 104.

Situation for 19 November: (1) V 712/22 evening independently Cherbourg–Alderney, then night troop convoy of 19/20 November Midsland Alderney–Guernsey; (2) complete night troop convoy of 18/19 November Malo–Jersey–Guernsey, immediate readiness 1800–2300 for T 23/Condor, then night troop convoy of 19/20 November Minotaure and Holland from Guernsey and La France from Jersey to Malo [escort omitted in this item, V 711/29 in related orders]; (3) V 207 magnetic treatment at Malo; (4) V 212/13 ready at Malo; (5) V 208 fumigation at Malo; (6) V 209/10 Malo–Cherbourg with Ad. le Prince in tow of Balidar and Nungesser; (7) C group of 46th Minesweeping Flotilla route sweeping with SSG Malo–Corbière–Granville; (8) R 104 with two HS-boats Jersey–Guernsey. Escorted tonnage: 5,050 GRT.

Intentions for 20 November: (1) V 712/22 and R 104 night troop convoy of 20/21 November Karel Guernsey–Alderney; (2) V 711/29 complete night troop convoy of 19/20 November Guernsey–Jersey–Malo; (3) V 207/12/13 onward convoy Leesee at 1200 Malo–Cherbourg; (4) V 208 fitting out at Malo; (5) V 209/10 complete convoy Malo–Cherbourg; (6) M 4605/04/02 passage Granville–Malo, then tug and floating crane Jersey–Guernsey [route as printed]; (7) M 4600/01/06 route sweeping with SSG Granville–Malo.

1340, Malo: Secret command teletype from 3rd Security Division reports T 23/Condor passage west from Cherbourg at 1800. I order V 711/29 to remain at immediate readiness in Guernsey from 1800–2300 and postpone the announced night troop convoy until 2300. 1600, Malo: Secret command teletype from 3rd Security Division changes torpedo boats’ passage speed because M 85 will join.

1715, Malo: By urgent teletype to Naval Signals Officer Cherbourg for onward urgent radio transmission to T 23: “No possible encounters in the Channel Islands area.” 1730, Cherbourg: T 23, Condor and M 85 sailed west. 1740, Cherbourg: V 209/10 arrived with Ad. le Prince and tugs Balidar and Nungesser from Jersey [origin as printed]. 1830, Malo: Departure report received for FK 01/02 leaving Granville at 1615 for Jersey–Guernsey, although the intention previously reported twice had been passage only as far as Jersey.

Remark: Depending on the time of onward departure from Jersey for Guernsey, an encounter with the torpedo boats might arise. A decision here could be made only when Jersey reported departure.

1930, Cherbourg: V 712/22 sailed for Alderney. 2000, Malo: M 4605/04/02 arrived from Jersey. 2030, Malo: Telephone report received of the arrival at Jersey of “Granville task 11”, which includes the two FK boats.

Remark: This arrival report evidently completed “Granville task 11”, so there was no longer any need to radio a warning of a possible encounter between the FK boats and torpedo boats. Enquiry of Harbour Commandant Granville next morning established that the FK boats had received orders only as far as Jersey, with instructions to obtain new orders there. Harbour Captain Granville, Sub-Lieutenant Heynen, expressly confirmed that he had not known that the two boats were to continue beyond Jersey to Guernsey. He had added “to Jersey–Guernsey” to his departure report only as a precaution, “for all eventualities”.

2020, Jersey [recorded after 2030]: FK 01/02, carrying senior officers, sailed for Guernsey without the Convoy Control Office’s knowledge, because Jersey sent no departure report. 2126, grid BF 3577, right centre: T 23/Condor mistook FK 01/02 for British motor torpedo boats. Since they did not answer the letter recognition signal for naval forces, with which they had not been equipped for that day, and fired recognition cartridge 5 only after two minutes, they were fired upon.

After ceasefire, FK 01/02 were recognised as German. T 23 escorted FK 01 to Corbière; Kondor and M 85 towed FK 02 to Guernsey. T 23 also went to Guernsey after releasing FK 02 [boat number as printed in final sentence].

Remarks on the causes of this costly firing on friendly vessels: (1) Convoy Control Office did not know that FK 01/02 had sailed again immediately after their reported arrival at Jersey. Consequently, the radio message to T 23 stating there were no possible encounters was not corrected. (2) FK 01/02 culpably lacked the letter recognition signal for naval forces. As the torpedo-boat commanders learned after the action, on departure from Guernsey for Granville they had been issued this signal only for the days of the outward and return journeys. The return had taken longer, so the boat commanders should have obtained the day’s recognition signal before leaving Granville or at Jersey. The torpedo boats began effective fire against the two vessels only when the requested letter recognition signal was not answered.

(3) According to the commanders of T 23, Kondor and M 85, the conduct of FK 01/02’s commanders was highly suspicious. On sighting the silhouettes of the two FK boats, the torpedo boats first fired numerous illuminating shells. Had FK 01/02 immediately fired the correct recognition cartridge, the torpedo boats would very probably have been reassured. In fact, approximately two minutes allegedly elapsed before they fired it. Their signal pistol was said to have failed when they attempted to fire immediately and had to be taken below and put right under lighting. In any event, the delay before firing the otherwise correct cartridge appeared suspicious, so another exchange was demanded by letter recognition signal, which, as explained above, was not answered.

(4) The torpedo-boat commanders reported that after the encounter FK 01/02 behaved as enemy fast boats might when detected prematurely: they allegedly increased speed and attempted to escape westwards, towards the enemy coast. The FK commanders were said to have believed the torpedo boats were enemy vessels; in that case the diary writer finds their failure to return fire incomprehensible.

Editorial note: These explanations and allegations reproduce the St Malo office’s account and attributed statements. They should be read alongside the Channel Islands command’s separate investigation under the same date; they are not independent findings of this translation.

2230, Alderney: V 712/22 arrived from Cherbourg. 2300, Guernsey: V 711/29 sailed with convoy for Jersey–Malo. Holland was not ready and was replaced by RO 21. Signed for the commander, Wunderlich.

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0626–0628, original pages 7–10.