19 November 1942 Part 1

19 November 1942 Channel Islands Sea Defence diary

Weather: wind from 50°, 4 metres per second.

From 05:49 the Alderney radar again detected unidentified targets in grid BF 3519, right edge centre. From 06:45–06:48 Batterie West and Army Coastal Battery 462 fired at these targets in BF 3515, lower edge right: eleven 15-cm rounds and sixteen 15-cm rounds respectively. The targets turned north when fired upon.

The Sea Commander’s assessment of the firing follows. From the speed and course of the detected targets, these could only have been enemy vessels. All batteries under Artillery Commander Alderney should therefore have been alerted simultaneously, by about 22:55 at the latest, instead of consecutively as actually happened. He also disagreed with the employment of the batteries. Above all, illumination shells were inappropriate, particularly at the limit of their range. Very small, fast targets—undoubtedly E-boats in this case, in his assessment—were unlikely to remain illuminated. Brief illumination was useless for firing and caused the enemy to turn away prematurely.

To achieve success against the fairly reliably detected E-boats, it would have been better to let them approach and then deliver several simultaneous surprise concentrations from all batteries. Only this method might have succeeded, particularly since Batterie Falke and the anti-aircraft batteries could have joined at closer range. Consecutive battery action dissipated the effect. The use of medium batteries against E-boats at ranges over 100 hm was considered entirely pointless, particularly when only one battery fired. The targets tracked from 06:21–06:54 should therefore not have been engaged. [Range notation in the scan is awkwardly typed; interpreted as 100 hm.]

Another fundamental error delayed Elsass’s opening of fire: the artillery commander’s permission was sought only after targets had been sighted by illumination-shell light. The combat battery was also not loaded while illumination shells were being fired. It had to be able to open fire immediately on illuminated targets, and must therefore be loaded beforehand. The artillery commander must decide from the radar detections whether the targets were hostile and, if convinced, give general permission to fire in advance. Otherwise the batteries would always be too late, particularly against fast targets. A copy of this assessment was sent to Artillery Commander Alderney for instruction.

09:40: 319th Infantry Division cancelled “Threatened danger”. 12:15: travelling Alderney–Guernsey, harbour-protection boat FK 03 sighted and destroyed a drifting mine two nautical miles north-east of Les Fougères lighthouse, BF 3547. Expenditure: 250 rounds of 2-cm ammunition and 200 rifle rounds. From 18:00, 319th Infantry Division ordered “Threatened danger”.

21:26: harbour-protection boats FK 01 and FK 02, travelling Granville–Jersey–Guernsey, were fired upon in BF 3577, right centre, by T 23, which was travelling Cherbourg–La Pallice with Condor and M 85.

T 23’s commander reported: St Malo Convoy Control Office had broadcast by radio message 1845/81 KR on the coastal long wave that there would be no shipping between the Channel Islands during the passage, although Harbour Commandant Granville had teletyped G 4649 at 19:55: “Group position 11 departed Granville at 16:15 for Jersey–Guernsey.” The two boats were steering west and gave the impression of British steam gunboats. When fire opened they increased to maximum speed and tried to escape west. On a letter recognition challenge they fired recognition cartridge 5. Fire was immediately stopped and exchange of letter recognition signals requested. There was no answer; the boats continued west at maximum speed. T 23 turned hard in pursuit, went to utmost speed and reopened fire. Hits stopped the boats. Searchlight illumination revealed the German war ensign; fire was immediately stopped because only then was their identity clear. According to FK 02’s crew, they had taken the torpedo boats for British destroyers and attempted to escape. [This paragraph reproduces T 23’s reported account; the Sea Commander disputes parts of it below.]

The Sea Commander’s findings: Harbour Commandant Granville had indeed teletyped G 4649 at 19:55, reporting FK 01 and FK 02’s departure at 16:15 for Jersey and Guernsey. St Malo could therefore have had no doubt that they were proceeding to Guernsey. Granville had also supplemented teletype G 4648: “Group task 11 of 18 November departs at 15:30 on 19 November for Jersey. Joining: Arques, Georges Guynemer with Naphta II, loaded with petrol and oil. Eight nautical miles [speed, i.e. knots].” Only these last three vessels were intended for Jersey, escorted by FK 01 and FK 02. Harbour Commandant Jersey’s arrival report could therefore refer only to Arques, Georges Guynemer and Naphta II. Given G 4649’s clear wording, St Malo should not have broadcast 1845/81 KR, stating that no shipping would be between the Channel Islands during the torpedo boats’ approximately 20:00–22:00 passage. At least a prior enquiry to the Sea Commander was required.

In the Sea Commander’s opinion, it was fundamentally wrong for a distant office such as St Malo to make such statements about inter-island shipping without consulting him. From the mainland it was impossible to know whether individual convoys could keep exact arrival and departure times; changes were frequent. That same night another Guernsey–St Malo convoy was due to leave at 23:00. It might have left one or two hours earlier, while overloaded communications could greatly delay notifying St Malo. Such delays were frequent and known there. That convoy would then also have met the torpedo boats. Such assurances to naval forces were extremely dangerous. To prevent every meeting of naval forces and convoys—which was unnecessary if recognition procedures functioned—all convoy traffic for the night would have to stop. He doubted whether that served the islands’ supplies and leave traffic.

According to helmsman Ewert, FK 01 had repeatedly given the recognition signal for naval aircraft and merchant ships because Harbour Commandant Granville could not supply the naval surface-force signal. There was no response. Only when the torpedo boats fired did he also fire the valid recognition cartridge three times successively. The Sea Commander could not explain the subsequent firing, especially as the harbour-protection boats had used no weapons, whereas British vessels would probably have done so. The boats apparently did not see the recognition exchange requested by T 23. Their behaviour and course posed no immediate danger; the torpedo boats should have exhausted all means of identifying them before opening fire. The Sea Commander assumed that the letter recognition signal for naval aircraft had not been seen. However, the torpedo boats acknowledged seeing the star recognition signal. Although this was not the prescribed form, it was valid for that night and should at least have raised doubt about opening fire.

The harbour-protection boats initially had no doubt that the vessels were German. The Sea Commander therefore rejected T 23’s claim that they fled west at maximum speed: they had not deviated from their Guernsey course. This too should have given the torpedo boats pause. He concluded that neither harbour-protection boat was to blame, and that Harbour Commandants Granville and Jersey had sent the relevant shipping reports correctly and in time. Use of the naval-aircraft recognition signal instead of the surface-force signal was explained by Granville’s inability to supply the latter despite the boat commander’s request. [These are the Sea Commander’s findings, retained separately from the St Malo diary’s differing account.]

Total casualties on the two boats — killed: Colonel Christiani, 319th Infantry Division; Major Banek, 319th Infantry Division; Senior Field Veterinary Officer Fürst, 319th Infantry Division; Helmsman Gefreiter Gerhard Hirschmüller, Channel Islands Harbour Protection Flotilla; Machinery Obergefreiter Hans van Kamp, same flotilla; Machinery Obergefreiter Erwin Kamper, same flotilla; Obergefreiter Wackes, divisional staff, 319th Infantry Division.

Wounded: Naval Artilleryman Hans Vach, Evaluation Detachment 4; Gefreiter Wilhelm Slotter, Naval Shipboard Anti-Aircraft Unit, Granville; Naval Artilleryman Joh. Hartwigsen, Evaluation Detachment 4; Obergefreiter Alex. Schmidt, same detachment; Naval Artilleryman Wilh. Seiffhardt, same detachment; Obergefreiter Fritz Dittmann, same detachment; Unteroffizier Arno Haun, staff of Divisional Supply 71; Obersoldat Hch. Szymanski, same staff; Maat Hbt. Groenwald, Channel Islands Harbour Protection Flotilla. [Abbreviated forenames retained as printed.]

FK 01 was operational again. FK 02 could not be employed during repairs, expected to take four to six weeks. Otherwise no special occurrences.

Signed Steinbach.

T-1022 Roll 2422, PG 37996, scans 0551–0554.