12 October 1944 Part 4

12 October 1944 Naval command reorganisation and the islands

Miscellaneous. Reorganisation of Naval Group Command West. Its activity has ended for lack of operational command tasks. After transfer of ship establishment battalions to the Army and recovery of specialist naval personnel, only care of the encircled fortresses remains, apart from diminishing winding-up duties. Dissolving Group Command while leaving a small signals detachment for Commander-in-Chief West to maintain links between him, Luftwaffe Command West and the fortresses would finally separate the Navy from the fate of the encircled fortresses.

In my view that solution is impossible given the Navy’s large share of their personnel and material fighting strength. The encircled fortresses still contain 119,625 men, including 36,568 naval personnel. Of 901 guns of 7.5 cm and above, 570 are manned by the Navy. Provision of news and morale support by radio press service and comradeship broadcasts is performed exclusively by the Navy. Signals service, particularly the extensive radio traffic [continued].

Radio traffic between Senior Quartermaster West, Luftwaffe Command West and the fortresses to control air supply is handled by naval radio. Continual provision of naval supplies for air transport is required.

There are therefore only two solutions: (1) Convert Naval Group Command West into Naval Command West, subordinated for service matters directly to Naval High Command or Naval High Command North, under a younger flag officer. Or (2) subordinate all encircled fortresses to it, with direct subordination to Commander-in-Chief West in military command matters insofar as these concern land warfare. This would also simplify the cumbersome command arrangements caused by the present intermediate army groups and army headquarters, especially evident in the Channel Islands.

With Naval War Staff’s agreement the question was discussed with Commander-in-Chief West. The field marshal proposes combining the two solutions. He considers that the naval task remaining in the West no longer warrants a group command and therefore my command is not appropriate. He considers subordination of the fortresses to a naval command sensible and agrees with my proposal to entrust command to a younger flag officer. For personal and substantive reasons he requests my Chief of Staff, irrespective of the seniority of older fortress commandants. Corresponding applications will be made simultaneously to Armed Forces High Command and Naval High Command in agreement with Commander-in-Chief West.

T-1022 Roll 4008; PG 37611 | Frame 0429; original pages 7452, 7453; PG 37611 | Frame 0430; original pages 7454, 7455. Extract from T1022_R4008_English_Translation.docx.