10 September 1942 Part 3

10 September 1942 V 707 report on convoy 3303 and the losses of 3 September

At 1800 on 2 September I received Sea Commandant Normandy's order at Cherbourg to conduct convoy 3303 on 3 September. It comprised V 707/704/702/710 and tugs Ostsee, Normandie II with barge H 313 PM, Labaure, D 116 S, D 117 S, D 119 S, Guêpe 63 with H 293 and H 75 PM, and Guêpe 64 with H 253 and H 320 PM. [Several characters in this list are heavily inked; the accompanying sketch confirms the principal formation.] V 213 and coastal motor vessel Heinrich were to join at point Herz 330.

Sailing was ordered for 0330 on 3 September. At midnight on 2/3 September the sky was cloudless, southerly wind force 2, sea calm, barometer falling. Forecast 2046/43 for the central and western Channel: south-west to south force 2–3, sea state 1–2, visibility 15–20 nautical miles.

The convoy assembled outside Cherbourg harbour entrance and began passage at 0400, with the fastest boat, V 702, as rear escort. To use the current and shelter from land, the initial true course was 295°. Speed initially 7 knots; the head reached point 328 at 0740. Radio message 0528/[suffix unclear] brought a storm warning for Brest–Nantes and the western Channel. Since towing gear reliability depends not only on wind and sea but also on the duration of strain, I decided to seek refuge at St Peter Port. Returning to Cherbourg would have meant prolonged passage against the current in this unwieldy convoy, with an unpleasant following sea.

To clarify the vessels' condition, I asked V 704 and at 0745 received a Morse message: “Still manageable in this sea. If it freshens further, St Peter Port recommended as refuge.” At 0810 I sent a W.d.L. message [source signalling designation retained]: “Intend entering Gustav owing to weather.”

1020: D 117 S at the rear sheered to port and lay across the wind. Ostsee followed, apparently to connect a tow; V 702 stayed near them. Although the convoy, making 3 knots, was almost stationary, the distance from its head to the drifting tug grew, so I ordered V 710 between V 702 and my boat to maintain visual contact. 1040: Normandie II, towing H 313 PM, signalled engine failure and asked us to wait. Tug and barge lay beam-on to the sea. 1050: I ordered the independently proceeding tug Labor [spelling differs from Labaure in the list] by megaphone to assist Normandie II. The order was not carried out; the reply was, “We ourselves cannot manage any longer.” 1106: V 702 signalled: “Tug D 117 S sunk; crew rescued.” I ordered V 702 to remain and assist Normandie II.

The convoy head had reached point 330 at 1045 and had since held almost stationary, without the expected V 213 and Heinrich joining. I later learned that both had returned to St Peter Port. At 1135, Guêpe 63's connections to H 75 PM and H 293 PM broke; the tug immediately began reconnecting. I ordered V 710 to remain nearby and assist if necessary. With the rest of the convoy I steered for St Peter Port at 4–5 knots to keep at least those vessels together and bring them in safely. Wind had increased to force 7, visibility improved, the sea was steep and violent, and the tide began to turn.

While Guêpe 63 struggled to reconnect H 75 PM, H 293 PM drifted far away. I ordered Ostsee to tow it and left V 704 to assist. Both operations eventually succeeded, although Guêpe 63 had to bring H 75 PM in stern first because the barge's bow had sea damage and her steering gear was damaged.

At 1200 I received V 213's radio message 1105/4 giving its position and asking for mine. I did not reply because I expected visual contact in less than an hour. At 1315, V 213 entered St Peter Port after reporting from point Ida 12. The convoy head—V 707, Labor, D 116 S, D 119 S, Guêpe 64, H 253 and H 320 PM—reached St Peter Port at 1500. The remainder—V 702/704/710, Ostsee with H 293 PM, Guêpe 63 with H 75 PM, and Normandie II—arrived about 1700. V 702's commanding officer reported H 313 PM had sunk shortly after 1400 with the loss of one man. His detailed report, including accident coordinates, is appended.

The main cause of the losses was the suddenly arising bad weather. However, adequate towing gear is indispensable for convoys of this kind; the convoy leader usually cannot verify it before departure. Vessels should also, as far as possible, carry a Morse signalling lamp, such as a Varta lamp, and anti-aircraft crews should receive short courses in basic Morse so that difficulties or damage can be reported promptly.

Signed on 10 September 1942: von Horn, Kapitänleutnant and commanding officer.

Formation sketch, scan 0507: The 0400 diagram places V 707 ahead, V 702 astern, V 710 to port and V 704 to starboard, with the tugs and barge tows between them. The 1145 sketch shows the convoy scattered near point 330, Normandie II with machinery failure and a broken towing connection, and Guêpe 63's barges with broken connections. It gives a scale marked at one and two nautical miles and identifies vessels by name or number. [The sketch is a schematic disposition, not a navigational chart.]

T-1022 Roll 2423, scans 0504–0505, enclosure pages 28–29, report signed 10 September; scan 0507, page 31, accompanying formation sketch. Reference V 707 B Nr. 0453. The report supplements the diary of the V 707/704 pair for 3 September 1942.